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The State of Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal Parentage for 
Gay Fathers 
ANNE R. DANA* 
“Assisted reproductive technologies bring to the fore important questions about . . . 
whom society deems entitled to reproduce and parent.”1 
 
This Article will examine the state of the law for determining parentage in 
gestational surrogacy arrangements, specifically with respect to homosexual 
male couples.  It will argue that despite the assumption that the development of 
gestational surrogacy shifted state legislatures and courts towards an intent test, 
a recent court decision involving a gay couple demonstrates that this is not 
necessarily the case.  Continued judicial bias reflecting enduring social 
stigmatization against two fathers and the desire to reinforce heterosexual 
procreation, along with unfair legal tests that discriminate against homosexual 
male couples because of biological gender differences and the necessity for a 
non-anonymous third party, results in gay male couples facing a greater 
challenge in being awarded legal parentage when a surrogacy dispute arises. 
The Article will argue that the solution is a pure intent test. 
INTRODUCTION 
Rapidly evolving technology addressing infertility problems has 
dramatically altered who is able to have children and how these children are 
conceived.  As a result, the use of assisted reproduction has risen dramatically.2  
The law in the United States, however, has not kept up.3  Courts continue to 
 
 * J.D. from Duke University School of Law, May 2011, and M.A. in Cultural Anthropology 
from Duke University, May 2011.  The author would like to extend recognition to Professor Marin 
Levy whose bioethics class provided the impetus for this paper and thank the staff members of the 
Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy for their assistance in making this Note possible. 
 1. JESSICA ARONS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FUTURE CHOICES: ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 1 (2007), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/ 
2007/12/pdf/arons_art.pdf. 
 2. See, e.g., Wendy Chavkin, Working Women, the Biological Clock, and Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies, in BEYOND STATES AND MARKETS: THE CHALLENGES OF SOCIAL REPRODUCTION 159, 159 
(Isabella Bakker & Rachel Silvey eds., 2008) (“Louise Brown, the world’s first test tube baby, is now 
30 years old.  In the two and a half decades since she was born, births such as hers have increased at 
a dizzying pace.  In 2002, some 33,000 American women delivered babies as a result of assisted 
reproductive technologies (ARTs) – more than twice the number who had done so in 1996.  
Additionally, more than double that number used ARTs unsuccessfully.”). 
 3. See Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional 
Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 599 (2002) (“[P]arentage disputes arising from assisted 
reproduction create confusion over what body of law should control their outcome . . . . 
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struggle with how to best resolve conflicts that arise out of the use of these new 
technologies.  The modern form of surrogacy—hiring a third party to carry and 
give birth to a child as an answer to infertility4—results in questions about who 
are the legal parent(s) of the child(ren) born out of this arrangement.5  Are the 
parents those with a genetic link to the child, the woman who gave birth to the 
child, or those who contracted and paid for the technology that produced the 
child? 
Medical and technological advances making conception without coitus 
possible gave rise to a growing number of people utilizing surrogacy 
arrangements as a method to procreate.6  With no direct federal or state 
guidance, these arrangements were initially governed solely by private 
contractual agreements.  As a result, when a dispute arose between the intended 
parents and the surrogate, it was up to judges to determine which parties were 
the legal parents.7  Judges in multiple states issued opinions that included a plea 
 
Unfortunately, these judicial and legislative efforts have done little to develop coherent and clear 
criteria for the determination of parentage in this area and appear even to be working somewhat at 
cross purposes.”); Linda S. Anderson, Adding Players to the Game: Parentage Determinations when 
Assisted Reproductive Technology is Used to Create Families, 62 ARK. L. REV. 29, 54-55 (2009) (“Courts 
that must determine parentage in situations involving the use of reproductive technology are facing 
a constantly changing set of circumstances in which these questions arise.  Science marches on, 
regardless of whether the law knows what to do about the resulting situations. . . . Societal norms 
change, even if the laws that define that society have not yet fully acknowledged the shift.”); 
Christen Blackburn, Family Law: Who is a Mother?  Determining Legal Maternity in Surrogacy 
Arrangements in Tennessee, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 349, 353 (2009). 
 4. The social arrangement of surrogacy has existed since biblical times as a way to circumvent 
a woman’s barren status.  Historically, surrogates were slaves or concubines, forced to have sexual 
intercourse with the intended father.  After birth, the child would be given to the intended mother.  
This is in stark contrast to today’s methods, which while still a social arrangement, follow ethical 
rules and employ advanced technology so that no intercourse occurs.  See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, 
Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203, 224 (2009). 
 5. Hereinafter, this Article will refer to parents as plural and child as singular for simplicity’s 
sake; however, not all surrogacy arrangements include two intended parents, and use of ARTs often 
results in multiple births. 
 6. See supra note 4. 
 7. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has addressed issues 
regarding parentage through the passage of multiple Acts, namely the Uniform Parentage Act 
(UPA) of 1973.  However, this version of the UPA did not address parentage in light of ARTs beyond 
artificial insemination.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1973) (“If, under the supervision 
of a licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with 
semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural 
father of a child thereby conceived.”).  In 1988, the Conference adopted the Uniform Status of 
Children of Assisted Conception Act (USCACA).  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, prefatory cmt. (2002).  
However, this resembled a model act more than a uniform act because it provided two opposing 
options regarding gestational surrogacy.  As of 2002, only two states had enacted the USCACA, 
selecting different options.  Id.  As a result, the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000, as amended in 2002, 
is the official recommendation of the Conference on the subject of parentage and makes obsolete all 
previous acts.  Id.  The 2002 UPA addresses ARTs in Article 7 and gestational agreements in Article 
8, providing guidance to states, but many state courts and legislatures established rules prior to the 
passage of the UPA.  See UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, arts. 7, 8 (2002); UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
LEGISLATIVE FACT SHEET - PARENTAGE ACT, available at http://uniformlaws.org/ 
LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (stating that Alabama, Delaware, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming have enacted the Uniform 
Parentage Act:); Courtney G. Joslin, The Legal Parentage of Children Born to Same-Sex Couples: 
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for guidance from their respective state legislatures,8 yet only a handful of states 
actually passed laws regarding parentage in the case of surrogacy 
arrangements,9 and today many states continue to rely on judicial 
determinations.10  The rules governing surrogacy arrangements vary widely.11  
The range of states’ rules and courts’ tests have led to unpredictable results, 
making it difficult for intended parents—meaning those parties who intend to 
have a child, take steps to bring a child into the world, and contract with a 
surrogate who agrees not to assert parental rights12—to rely on being deemed 
the legal parents in a court of law.13 
Two key cases with dramatically different holdings have helped define 
how states’ resolve this conflict: In re Baby M, decided by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in 1988,14 and Johnson v. Calvert, decided by the California 
Supreme Court in 1993.15  These cases have long been viewed as distinguishable 
due to the use of advanced technology—enabling gestational surrogacy—in the 
 
Developments in the Law, 39 FAM. L.Q. 683, 686-87 (2005) (“Approximately nineteen states have 
adopted some variation of the 1973 version of the UPA,” and “two states—North Dakota and 
Virginia—adopted the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (USCACA)”—which 
the UPA adopts practically verbatim. ).  Finally, how the UPA applies to unmarried gay couples 
remains in dispute.  Nicole L. Parness, Forcing A Square into A Circle: Why Are Courts Straining to 
Apply the Uniform Parentage Act to Gay Couples and Their Children?, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 893, 911 (2006) 
(“[P]arentage issues that gay parents face are left unclear because the UPA does not guide them in 
any way.”); Deirdre M. Bowen, The Parent Trap: Differential Familial Power in Same-Sex Families, 15 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 13 (2008) (stating that the 2002 UPA, which did address various 
ARTs, has been adopted by only seven states). 
 8. See, e.g., J.F. v. D.B., 848 N.E.2d 873, 881 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (Slaby, J. concurring) (“Unless 
the state legislators begin to address the multiple issues involved, it will be the children that will be 
caught in a continual tug of war . . . .”); In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 736 (Tenn. 2005) (“We, as 
interpreters of the law, not makers of the law, are powerless, in my view, to reach a different 
resolution.”); In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Ct. App. 1998) (“Again we must 
call on the Legislature to sort out the parental rights and responsibilities of those involved in 
artificial reproduction.”); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E. 2d 760, 767 n.3 (1994) (“[I]t would be beneficial to 
the law of surrogacy for the legislature to act and end this uncertainty.”); In re Adoption of Matthew 
B., 284 Cal. Rptr. 18, 37 (Ct. App. 1991) (“[W]e urge the Legislature to [act] expeditiously.”). 
 9. See infra Appendix I. 
 10. ARONS, supra note 1, at 25 (A non-exhaustive list of states that do not have statutes 
regulating surrogacy is: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.). 
 11. See Krawiec, supra note 4, at 225 (“United States federal law is silent on the issue of 
commercial surrogacy, leaving a hodge-podge of widely varying state laws governing the issue.”); 
R. Alta Charo, Legislative Approaches to Surrogate Motherhood, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 88, 107 
(Larry Gostin ed., 1990) (“Statutes, when enacted, are likely to vary considerably, ranging from 
complete bans to only minimal oversig-ht of contractual arrangements.”). 
 12. Storrow, supra note 3, at 642-43. 
 13. See id. at 601 (“Concerning maternity, courts have yet to cope successfully with the 
fragmentation of maternity by surrogacy and have issued decisions inspiring more speculation than 
certainty. . . . leaving gaps in the law that render unclear the outcome of potential future disputes.); 
Anderson, supra note 3, at 52 (“The variety of types of analyses employed by the courts, however, 
leads to unpredictable results and makes it difficult for anyone advising parents to accurately 
describe potential concerns.”). 
 14. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
 15. 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (Cal. 1993). 
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latter case, making it possible for the surrogate to have no genetic link to the 
child.  Gestation without a genetic link challenged established ideas about 
biological processes and enabled people to conceive of alternative notions of 
motherhood.16  For this reason, after the California decision commentators 
believed that the issue of parentage determinations in gestational surrogacy 
situations was obsolete.17  Yet a recent court decision makes it clear that this is 
not the case. 
In A.G.R. v. D.R.H.,18 a legally married gay couple contracted with a 
surrogate.19  Five months after giving birth to twin girls she changed her mind 
and asserted a legal right to be the girls’ mother.  Despite being a gestational 
surrogacy arrangement, the New Jersey Superior Court continued to rely on the 
rules established under Baby M.20  Such a decision suggests that when judges 
and politicians make determinations about who are the legal parents, their 
decisions may be influenced by cultural conditioning with respect to 
homosexuality and parenting.  This is supported by the contention that courts 
approach ART cases involving homosexual couples differently from ART cases 
involving heterosexual couples.21 
Court decisions setting precedent and legislative rules for determining 
legal parentage are applicable to all people who utilize a surrogacy 
arrangement; however, these results are particularly salient for homosexual 
male couples22 who are structurally unable to have children without assistance 
from a third party.  While lesbian couples also experience problems establishing 
legal parentage, the laws for establishing legal parenthood unfairly burden gay 
 
 16. See Storrow, supra note 3, at 605 (arguing that the law surrounding maternity in surrogacy 
cases reflects a judicial “willingness to revise the model of the traditional marital family to make it 
more malleable and complex”). 
 17. Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
no. 3, Summer 2009, 109, 122-23 (declaring that the difference between gestational and traditional 
surrogacy has created an important legal distinction, the result of which is that courts and 
legislatures have enacted laws directing that the intended parents, not the gestational surrogate, be 
named the legal parents); John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive 
Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 323, 360 (2004) (stating that “participants and practitioners in 
states without established law” with respect to the drawing a distinction between traditional and 
gestational surrogacy “have assumed that gestational surrogacy would be given effect”); Carol 
Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 72 
(2007) (arguing that Baby M was a result of four distinct factors that would not exist ten years later). 
 18. No. FD-09-1838-07, slip op. at 2 (N.J. Super. Cr. Ch. Div. Dec 23, 2009), available at http:// 
graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20091231_SURROGATE.pdf (Couple was “legally 
married under California law . . . and registered their domestic partnership in New Jersey pursuant 
to the New Jersey Domestic Partnership Act, N.J.S.A. 26:8A-1 et seq.”). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Deborah H. Wald, The Parentage Puzzle: The Interplay Between Genetics, Procreative Intent, and 
Parental Conduct in Determining Legal Parentage, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 379, 392 (2007). 
 22. I use the terms “homosexual male couple,” “same-sex male couple,” and “gay fathers” 
interchangeably in this Article.  While I recognize that none of these terms may be deemed perfect or 
adequately represent the social, cultural, and political identities chosen by various individuals and 
that they may leave out certain sexual identities, I have chosen them because they are the most 
universally recognized and provide for a semblance of consistency. 
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male couples because the law sets up standards that they are unable to meet.23  
Due to biological reproductive differences, homosexual male couples are unable 
to utilize loopholes available to lesbians utilizing various ARTs.  Additionally, 
the necessity of a surrogate for a gay male couple to have a child together means 
that a non-anonymous third party always exists to assert her right to parent the 
child.  Because there is no alternative mother to assert a competing right and 
thereby create a tie as is available to heterosexual couples utilizing gestational 
surrogacy, gay male couples appear unable to both be declared legal parents 
under established rules. 
With a rise in the number of children being born to same-sex couples,24 
determining who are the legal parents is becoming increasingly problematic and 
ripe for growing caseloads.25  Yet the law does not appear to know how to 
approach this litigation due to the alternative family structures and the novel 
case law that is required.  As a result of the new technology, established notions 
of procreation have been upended and existing legal frameworks cannot fully 
address the issues that arise in surrogacy arrangements.26  Thus, courts—such as 
the Superior Court of New Jersey—are improperly relying on decisions whose 
holdings are archaic and no longer applicable given modern technology.  If 
appealed A.G.R. may be decided differently, but the Superior Court’s continued 
reliance on the reasoning in Baby M points to the potential for other state courts 
to follow in its footsteps. 
Using A.G.R as a case study, this Article will argue that in situations of 
gestational surrogacy, courts should apply a pure intent-based test to determine 
the intent of all of the parties at the moment they entered into the surrogacy 
agreement.27  Such a test recognizes that ‘but for’ the genetic parents’ intent to 
 
 23. Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the 
Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 267 (2006) (asserting that “an approach that excludes all 
gay male couples from the easy and beneficial default rule and makes them instead navigate more 
onerous and intrusive hurdles, even if some traditional and lesbian couples occasionally face such 
hurdles as well” is gender-based). 
 24. See ABBIE E. GOLDBERG, LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN 3 (2010) (stating 
that there have been “actual increases in the number of lesbian and gay parents, particularly those 
who become parents in the context of same-sex committed relationships”); Uma Narayan, Family 
Ties: Rethinking Parental Claims in the Light of Surrogacy and Custody, in HAVING AND RAISING 
CHILDREN: UNCONVENTIONAL FAMILIES, HARD CHOICES, AND THE SOCIAL GOOD 65, 83 (Uma Narayan 
& Julia J. Bartkowiak eds.,1999); Joyce Kauffman, Protecting Parentage with Legal Connections, 32 FAM. 
ADVOC., Winter 2010, at 24. 
 25. Robertson, supra note 17, at 325. 
 26. See Storrow, supra note 3, at 603 (stating that without adequate legislative rules, courts have 
been left to reach parentage determinations based on existing precedents and on parallels drawn to 
artificial insemination legislation, which result in awkward decisions that do not account for the new 
methods of family formation). 
 27. While additional issues will arise in future cases – such as what will happen when neither 
the intended parent nor the surrogate mother has a genetic link – this Article cabins this issue and 
addresses only what happens in a gestational surrogacy arrangement, meaning that the surrogate 
has no genetic link and an intended parent does have a genetic link.  With that said, the central 
framework of this Article puts forth a broader proposal that I suggest should be considered for all 
surrogate arrangements in which the birth mother does not have a genetic connection to the child, 
given the increasingly complicated scenarios and multiple-party involvement that is sure to 
continue. 
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create the child, no parent-child relationship would exist, and therefore those 
who intended to parent the child are the legal and rightful parents.28  While the 
enforceability of the surrogacy contract is not compulsory under an intent test 
framework, a contract is one means to establish intentional procreative behavior 
and legal parentage.29  This Article will go on to argue that the other tests courts 
rely on to determine legal parenthood, including a presumption of parentage, 
evidence of a genetic relation, or a gestational approach, are problematic for a 
variety of reasons.  A pure intent test is the only available method for courts to 
determine parentage without gender, marital, or sexual orientation biases 
affecting the outcome. 
Central to this assertion is a concern regarding when disagreements over 
legal parentage arise.  The vast majority of surrogacy arrangements are 
successful, meaning the surrogate hands over the child to the intended parents 
post-birth without regrets or the desire to parent the child.30  The involvement of 
courts typically only occurs when a dispute arises and competing claims of 
parenthood are asserted.31  Therefore, central to an analysis establishing a 
default rule governing gestational surrogacy arrangements is the determination 
of which party the law should protect.  The argument in favor of an intent test 
relies on a two-fold belief about the role of the law.  First, the law should look at 
the overall outcome of all surrogacy arrangements and create a rule that 
reaffirms the majority result outside of the court’s involvement. Given that 
gestational surrogacy arrangements are broadly successful, the contention that 
an intent test is an appropriate method for governing these arrangements is 
compelling.  Second, the law should protect those parties who put in the effort, 
money, and desire to be parents because ‘but for’ this effort the child would not 
exist.  In sum, an intent test provides a default rule that supports the vast 
majority of parties involved in surrogacy arrangements, creates certainty for all 
intended parents prior to undergoing the rigor of a surrogacy arrangement, and 
creates a rule that treats all parties—no matter what gender, marital status, or 
sexual orientation—equally. 
Section I will provide a historical analysis, including an overview of the 
development of assisted reproductive technology (ART), the progression of legal 
developments in both case law and state statutes, and why a recent decision 
highlights the existing problems facing gay couples who intend to become 
parents.  Section II will examine existing homophobia and continued bias 
against gay fathers, how this impacts judicial determinations of legal parentage 
for these couples, and why the recent decision in A.G.R. was incorrectly decided.  
 
 28. Anderson, supra note 3, at 45. 
 29. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity 
for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 325 (1990).  Given that other papers have addressed this 
subject adequately, this Article will not address whether contractual enforcement is the best method 
for establishing intent. 
 30. Scott, supra note 17, at 127 (Even as early as the Baby M decision there was existing evidence 
that the vast majority of surrogacy arrangements were uncontested.). 
 31. States with statutes requiring a court’s approval prior to a surrogacy arrangement include 
Florida (only for traditional surrogacy), New Hampshire, Texas, Utah, and Virginia.  See infra 
Appendix I. 
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Section III will analyze the potential tests for determining parenthood, arguing 
that a pure intent test is proper. 
I.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THE CURRENT STATE OF SURROGACY LAWS 
A.  Infertility, Assisted Reproductive Technologies, and Surrogacy 
There are two categories of infertility: functional infertility and structural 
infertility.  Functional infertility occurs when a man or woman is unable to 
reproduce for medical reasons,32 including having a low sperm count, having no 
viable eggs, or being unable to carry a baby to term.33  Functional infertility 
affects approximately ten percent of the population, affects men and women 
equally, and affects individuals of all socioeconomic backgrounds.34  Most of the 
data that exists on infertility focuses on functional infertility.35  Structural 
infertility, on the other hand, is not a result of a medical condition.  Rather, it 
applies to the situation of individuals who are single or those who have a 
partner of the same sex, and therefore require another party’s biological 
assistance to reproduce.36  Data on how many people fall into this category is 
largely unavailable.37 
 
 32. See Margarete Sandelowski & Sheryl de Lacey, The Uses of a “Disease”: Infertility as Rhetorical 
Vehicle, in INFERTILITY AROUND THE GLOBE: NEW THINKING ON CHILDLESSNESS, GENDER, AND 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 33, 35 (Marcia C. Inhorn & Frank van Balen eds., 2002) (“Infertility 
remains ambiguous medically as it is variously conceptualized as itself a disease, a symptom of 
disease, a cause of disease, a consequence of disease, and as not a disease at all.  The etiology of 
infertility remains uncertain as biological, behavioral, psychological, and sociocultural factors 
continue to be variously implicated and as the actual causes of infertility in any one case are often 
difficult to discern, even when specific medical disorders are identified.”). 
 33. Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 24-25 (2008). 
 34. ARONS, supra note 1, at 2. 
 35. See Daar, supra note 33, at 25. 
 36. ARONS, supra note 1, at 2; see also Sandelowski & de Lacey, supra note 32, at 35 ([S]ingle 
persons and gay and lesbian couples [are seen] to be ‘dysfertile,’ that is, as unsuitable for parenthood 
no matter what their fertility status.”). 
 37. See Daar, supra note 33, at 25; Holly J. Harlow, Paternalism Without Paternity: Discrimination 
Against Single Women Seeking Artificial Insemination by Donor, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 173, 
178 (1996) (“The statistics show that more and more single women seek AID.  It is, however, difficult 
to accurately estimate the number of single women who use AID because there are no federal 
regulations which govern AID or require record-keeping of women who seek physician assistance 
for insemination.”); David D. Meyer, Parenthood in Transition: A United States Perspective, in TENSIONS 
BETWEEN LEGAL, BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL CONCEPTIONS OF PARENTAGE 369, 375 (Ingeborg 
Schwenzer ed., 2007) (“[M]any more unmarried women are electing . . . parenthood.”); Sabrina 
Tavernise, Parenting by Gays More Common in the South, Census Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/19/us/19gays.html (“In 2009, the Census Bureau estimated 
that there were 581,000 same-sex couples living in the United States . . . . [T]he bureau does not count 
gay singles.”); Sharon Jayson, Gay Couples: A Close Look at this Modern Family, Parenting, USA TODAY, 
Nov. 5 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-11-05-gayparents05_ST_N.htm (“One 
in five male couples and one in three lesbian couples were raising children as of the 2000 Census.  
That’s way up from 1990, when one in 20 male couples and one in five lesbian couples had kids.”); 
Robertson, supra note 17, at 324 (“As more gays and lesbians enter into partnership arrangements, a 
growing number will seek to have children.  To do so they will turn to assisted reproductive 
techniques . . . .”). 
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ARTs developed in response to infertility and the desire to have a 
genetically related child.  An ART is defined as any fertility procedure in which 
both the eggs and the sperm are manipulated outside of the body.  The most well 
known type of ART is In Vitro Fertilization (IVF),38 in which eggs are removed 
from a woman’s ovaries and combined with a man’s sperm in a petri dish.  The 
resulting embryos are then implanted in a woman’s uterus.39  While neither the 
use of fertility drugs to stimulate egg production in ovaries nor Intrauterine 
Insemination (IUI), also known as Artificial Insemination (AI), technically fall 
under the ART umbrella because they occur inside a woman’s body and do not 
involve manipulation of both sperm and eggs, they are generally associated 
with ARTs due to their use in fertility treatments.40  Similarly, surrogacy itself is 
not a medical technology; it is a social arrangement between people.41  However, 
this arrangement is discussed within the context of ARTs because surrogacy 
utilizes either AI or IVF. 
Surrogacy is a method of childbearing that can be used to circumvent 
functional infertility for women and structural infertility for gay or single men.42  
A woman, called a surrogate, agrees to gestate and give birth to a child that she 
does not plan on raising as her own.  The party who contracts for the child, 
whether a single person or a couple, is referred to as the intended parent(s).  
Today there are two forms of surrogacy: traditional surrogacy and gestational 
surrogacy. 
In traditional surrogacy, a woman who does not intend to be the legal 
parent agrees to be artificially inseminated with the sperm of a man who is not 
her husband.43  Often the sperm that is used is that of the intended father, as it 
creates a genetic link to one of the intended parents, although this is not always 
 
 38. Technological advances have created variations of IVF, including GIFT, ZIFT, and TUDOR.  
I use IVF as an umbrella term to refer to all procedures involving hyperovulation and egg removal.  
See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION, INFERTILITY, AND THE NEW WORLD OF 
CHILD PRODUCTION 201 (1993); JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE BATTLE OVER WOMEN’S FREEDOM 12 (1993). 
 39. BARTHOLET, supra note 38, at 192.  IVF can involve up to three different women playing the 
attendant roles: the egg donor, the intended mother, and the birth mother.  However, one woman 
can also fill all three roles.  Depending on the infertility problem, a woman can use her own egg and 
IVF technology, and then have the embryo implanted in her own uterus.  A woman could also use 
another woman’s donated eggs and IVF technology, and then have the embryo implanted in her 
own uterus.  The intended mother can use her own egg but have the embryo implanted in another 
woman, who upon birth will relinquish the child.  Finally, the intended mother can purchase a 
donated egg and hire a surrogate to carry the child to term.  These various combinations 
demonstrate the complexity of determining legal parenthood. 
 40. ARONS, supra note 1, at 5. 
 41. Surrogacy is considered a social arrangement because prior to technological developments 
such as IVF, a fertile woman could use a rudimentary form of fertilization—such as insemination 
with a turkey baster—to become pregnant, and upon the birth of the child give it to the infertile 
woman.  Today surrogacy arrangements utilize technological advances such as IVF, which is why 
the modern form is discussed alongside ARTs.  See Alexa E. King, Solomon Revisited: Assigning 
Parenthood in the Context of Collaborative Reproduction, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 329, 340-41 (1995). 
 42. ARONS, supra note 1, at 6. 
 43. E.g., Jennifer L. Watson, Growing a Baby for Sale or Merely Renting a Womb: Should Surrogate 
Mothers be Compensated for Their Services?, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 529, 529 (2007).  Some 
states, including Virginia, require that the surrogate be married.  See ARONS, supra note 1, at 26-27, 
40. 
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the case—the sperm can be from a third-party donor.  Through the use of AI, the 
sperm and the surrogate’s egg join to create the fetus.44  As a result, the 
surrogate has a genetic link to the child and one of the intended parents may 
also have a genetic link to the child.  In uncontested cases, once the child is born 
the surrogate terminates her parental rights and the intended parents become 
the legal parents, raising the child as their own.45  In contested cases, a problem 
arises if the surrogate decides she wants to retain her parental rights and raise 
the child herself.  Because the surrogate is both the birth mother and the genetic 
mother, many people viewed traditional surrogacy arrangements as forcing a 
woman to give up her child—likening it to baby-selling, which prompted 
serious legal and ethical debates about how to determine parentage.46 
Concerns focused on the commodification and exploitation of women in 
traditional surrogacy arrangements.  The commodification argument viewed 
commercial surrogacy as the conversion of women’s labor—namely giving birth 
to a child—into a commodity to be sold in the marketplace.  Through this 
process the surrogate goes from being a person worthy of respect and 
consideration to being a disposable object.47  The exploitation argument focused 
on which women were surrogates versus which women were intended mothers—
highlighting class and race concerns—declaring that surrogates would be poor 
and minority women laboring for wealthy white women.  This concern 
manifested itself through apprehension over surrogacy contracts and the 
potential for unequal bargaining power.48 
 
 44. Id. at 5. 
 45. States differ on the rules for handling the birth of a child to a surrogate.  Some states allow a 
pre-birth order that places the name of the non-genetically related party on the birth certificate, 
designating that person as a parent.  Other states require adoption by the second parent.  States 
differ on the rules for handling the birth of a child to a surrogate.  Some states allow a pre-birth 
order via statute or case law, which allows the hospital to place the intended parents’ names on the 
child’s birth certificate, rather than naming the surrogate.  Other states expressly prohibit pre-birth 
orders.  See Steven H. Snyder & Mary Patricia Byrn, The Use of Prebirth Parentage Orders in Surrogacy 
Proceedings, 39 FAM. L.Q. 633, 637-38, 642 (2005); Erin V. Podolny, Are You My Mother?: Removing A 
Gestational Surrogate's Name from the Birth Certificate in the Name of Equal Protection, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE, 
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 351, 374 (2008).  Other states require a same-sex couple to complete a 
second-parent adoption, which allows the partner of the legally recognized parent to become a 
second parent via consent, without terminating the partner’s parental rights.  Second-parent 
adoption is available in at least ten states.  See Deirdre M. Bowen, supra note 7, at 7; Nancy D. 
Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian 
Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 204 (2009). 
 46. DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE 
COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 78 (2006). 
 47. Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71, 80 (1990). 
 48. See, e.g., Mary Gibson, Contract Motherhood: Social Practice in Social Context, in LIVING WITH 
CONTRADICTIONS: CONTROVERSIES IN FEMINIST SOCIAL ETHICS, 402, 402-16 (Alison M. Jaggar 
ed.,1994); Christine T. Sistare, Reproductive Freedom and Women’s Freedom: Surrogacy and Autonomy, in 
LIVING WITH CONTRADICTIONS: CONTROVERSIES IN FEMINIST SOCIAL ETHICS, supra, at 395, 398; Janice 
G. Raymond, WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE BATTLE OVER WOMEN’S 
FREEDOM 90-93 (1993); Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or a 
Commodification of Women’s Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 113, 160 (1997); Richard F. 
Storrow, Quests for Conception: Fertility Tourists, Globalization and Feminist Legal Theory, 57 HASTINGS 
L. J. 295 (2005); Hilary Rose, Victorian Values in the Test-tube: The Politics of Reproductive Science and 
Technology, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (Michelle Stanworth ed., 1987); Janet Gallagher, Eggs, 
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The development of IVF,49 which involves the creation of an embryo in a 
test tube that can then be implanted in a woman’s uterus, helped to bring about 
broader social acceptance of surrogacy arrangements.50  This technology, which 
became widely available to the public in the late 1980s,51 made gestational 
surrogacy possible—with profound effects on the ethical debate.  Couples could 
now use their own egg and sperm, or utilize a third party’s egg or sperm, to 
create an embryo to be implanted in the body of another woman who agreed to 
gestate and bear the child for the intended parents.52  Gestational surrogacy 
allowed women with functional infertility and gay men with structural 
infertility to reproduce. 
Gestational surrogacy was credited with transforming the legal and 
cultural debate surrounding surrogacy.53  What sets gestational surrogacy apart 
from traditional surrogacy is that the woman who bears the child is not 
genetically related to the child.54  This shift eased legal and ethical concerns 
about separating a mother from her offspring and increased the number of 
women willing to provide pregnancy-without-eggs.55  Women were more 
comfortable with the idea of gestational surrogacy arrangements, describing the 
 
Embryos and Foetuses: Anxiety and the Law, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD 
AND MEDICINE, supra, at 139, 146. 
 49. BARTHOLET, supra note 38, at 192 (In 1978 the first baby conceived via IVF was born in Great 
Britain.). 
 50. Scott, supra note 17, at 111. 
 51. SPAR, supra note 46, at 82. 
 52. Once a woman decides to become a surrogate, her body has to be “prepared” so that it will 
accept a pregnancy with an embryo that is not genetically related to her.  Several weeks prior to the 
transfer of the embryo, the surrogate must start taking birth control pills and shots of hormones in 
order to suppress her ovulatory cycle.  Then, she is injected with estrogen in order to build the 
uterine lining.  After the embryo is transferred, she must receive daily injections of progesterone 
until her body “understands” that it is pregnant and can sustain the pregnancy on its own.  Short-
term side effects include hot flashes, mood swings, headaches, bloating, vaginal spotting, uterine 
cramping, light-headedness, vaginal irritation, and pain at the injection site.  Long-term effects are 
still largely unknown.  Amrita Pande, Not an “Angel”, not a “Whore”: Surrogates as “Dirty” Workers in 
India, 16 INDIAN J. GENDER STUD. 141, 147 (2009). 
 53. See SPAR, supra note 46, at 78 (“As the debates over surrogacy continued to rage, however, 
scientific developments were already rendering them largely moot.  By the mid-1980s, new 
technologies for conception had supplanted the traditional model of surrogacy, creating a substitute 
with far greater commercial potential. . . . gestational surrogacy.”); Scott, supra note 17, at 111-12 (“I 
seek to explain how and why the social and political meanings of surrogacy have changed over the 
past decade. . . . [A]dvances in IVF have expanded the use of gestational surrogacy, which, because 
the surrogate is not genetically related to the baby, was less readily framed as commodification and 
thus was more palatable than traditional surrogacy.”).  But note that this shift is largely within the 
context of the United States and that the early feminist arguments of commodification and 
exploitation have resurfaced within the international surrogacy market.  See generally Arlie 
Hochschild, Childbirth at the Global Crossroads, AM. PROSPECT, Oct. 5, 2009, at 25; Antony Barnett & 
Helena Smith, Cruel Cost of the Human Egg Trade, OBSERVER, Apr. 30, 2006, http:// 
www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/apr/30/health.healthandwellbeing; Amana Fontanella-Khan, India, 
the Rent-a-Womb Capital of the World, SLATE (Aug. 23, 2010, 7:03 AM), http:// 
www.slate.com/id/2263136; Anuj Chopra, Childless Couples Look to India for Surrogate Mothers, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 3, 2006, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0403/p01s04-wosc.html. 
 54. King, supra note 41, at 341. 
 55. SPAR, supra note 46, at 82. 
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relationship with the fetus as less that of a mother and more like a babysitter.56  
Further, the lack of a genetic relationship challenged the commodification and 
baby-selling argument by cultivating surrogates’ identities as “carriers” rather 
than “mothers.”57 
Nonetheless, the new technology gave rise to increasingly complicated 
debates about who the rightful parents of the resulting child are.  A child born 
out of a gestational surrogacy arrangement can have up to five prospective 
parents: (1) the intended mother; (2) the intended father; (3) the gestational 
mother; (4) the genetic parent via egg donation; and (5) the genetic parent via 
sperm donation.  In a gestational surrogacy arrangement the intended parents 
may also be the genetic parents, providing both egg and sperm, or, if they have 
additional functional infertility problems, one or both of the genetic parents can 
be third-party donors.  For gay men, gestational surrogacy requires a third-party 
egg donor, meaning at most only one of the intended parents can be genetically 
related to the resulting child. The sperm can be from one of the two fathers, or if 
both men face functional infertility the sperm can also be from a third party 
donor.  The number of parties that may be involved clearly makes 
determination of the legal parentage of the child difficult.  If the intended 
parents are homosexual, this only compounds the difficulty of determining 
parentage because having two fathers conflicts with traditional notions of family 
formation. 
These complications and the attending legal risks have not greatly deterred 
Americans from pursuing gestational surrogacy options.  Today, ninety-five 
percent of surrogacy arrangements in the United States are gestational.58  Every 
year around 750 children are born in the United States through gestational 
surrogacy, and at least twice that many surrogacies are attempted.59  These 
factors have created a growing ART industry that reports annual revenues of 
nearly seven billion dollars.60  The economic cost of surrogacy varies, but 
generally includes fees to a surrogacy agency for connecting the parties, legal 
fees for the execution of a contract between the surrogate and intended parents, 
the expense of various ART procedures from a certified medical provider, and 
compensation to the surrogate.  All together the process can easily cost 
$100,000.61  The legal uncertainty of surrogacy agreements contributes to the 
 
 56. Scott, supra note 17, at 139. 
 57. Id. at 140. 
 58. Sanger, supra note 17, at 79. 
 59. Stephanie Saul, Building a Baby, With Few Ground Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13 2009, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/us/13surrogacy.html; see also, Krawiec, supra note 4, at 205 (stating 
that in 2001, 41,000 children were born in the United States using ARTs, 600 of whom were carried 
by surrogates). 
 60. Daar, supra note 33, at 25. 
 61. See SPAR, supra note 46, at xii (stating that multiple rounds of IVF treatment and several 
batches of eggs can easily cost between $50,000 and $100,000); Abigail Haworth, Surrogate Mothers: 
Womb for Rent, MARIE CLAIRE, July 29, 2007, http://www.marieclaire.com/print-this/world-
reports/news/international/surrogate-mothers-india (stating that the cost of surrogacy in the 
United States can be $70,000). 
Dana_paginated 9/7/2011  6:03:54 PM 
364 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 18:353 2011 
need for intermediaries, enabling these intermediaries to demand large 
compensation when a successful agreement is completed.62 
For gestational surrogacy to be a successful industry, women who are 
willing participants must be readily available.  Women cite three main reasons 
for wanting to be surrogates: they like being pregnant, they want the money, 
and they view having a baby for a childless couple as providing an altruistic 
gift.63  Many women also point to the fact that being a surrogate enables them to 
stay home with their own children while pregnant with someone else’s baby.64  
A successful industry, however, also requires surrogates to relinquish the child 
upon its birth, and for the intended parents to assume responsibility for the 
child.  If any party changes his or her mind, a host of legal issues arise. 
B.  The Law and Determining Legal Parentage 
 Until recently, judicial decisions as well as the type of state statutes passed 
over the past three decades appeared to acknowledge the social and cultural 
shift created by the development of gestational surrogacy.  This assumption is 
contested by a New Jersey Superior Court decision involving a homosexual 
male couple.  The outcome of the case highlights the judicial bias against gay 
fathers and the unfair burden that gay men face in establishing parentage in a 
gestational surrogacy dispute. 
i. Traditional Surrogacy 
Baby M was the first significant case to address this innovative use of 
reproductive technology.65  In 1985 William Stern entered into a traditional 
surrogacy contract with Mary Beth Whitehead and her husband.  They agreed 
that through AI with Mr. Stern’s sperm Ms. Whitehead would become pregnant, 
and that upon the birth of the child she would relinquish her parental rights, 
allowing Mr. Stern and his wife to raise the child as their own.  In exchange for 
Mrs. Whitehead’s service, Mr. Stern would pay Ms. Whitehead $10,000.  Upon 
the birth of the child, however, Ms. Whitehead decided that she could not part 
with the baby girl.  Mr. Stern filed for custody and enforcement of the contract.66  
The subsequent court hearings highlighted the legal conundrum that these new 
 
 62. Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1767 (2010). 
 63. Sanger, supra note 17, at 76.  Some states do not regulate payment to surrogates.  This Article 
will not address the issue of payment, but for a more detailed discussion, see generally Krawiec, 
supra note 4. 
 64. Sanger, supra note 17, at 76. 
 65. See Scott, supra note 17, at 109, 112-13 (“It was through the lens of Baby M that this 
innovative use of reproductive technology was first scrutinized as an issue of social, political, and 
legal interest” but at the time of the Baby M decision, “a few courts had addressed whether 
surrogacy contracts were enforceable.”); see also Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Kentucky, 704 
S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986) (holding that a Kentucky state statute prohibiting the sale of a child for the 
purpose of adoption does not apply to surrogacy contracts entered into prior to conception); 
Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 362 N.W.2d 211 (Mich. 1985) (holding that the Michigan Paternity Act, 
allowing the putative father of a child born out of wedlock to seek a determination of paternity, 
applies when a surrogate mother is married and the biological and intended father is married to a 
different woman). 
 66. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1235-37 (N.J. 1988). 
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reproductive technologies produced and incited public outcry as different 
organizations and private actors weighed in on who should be deemed the 
parents of Baby M. 
Central to the decision was the court’s determination that the surrogacy 
arrangement was analogous to adoption.  This allowed the court to hold that the 
surrogacy contract was in direct conflict with state adoption laws because: (1) 
the exchange of money is prohibited; (2) proof of parental unfitness or 
abandonment is required before termination of parental rights is ordered and an 
adoption is granted; and (3) the surrender of custody and consent to adoption is 
revocable in private placement adoptions.67  The court saw the payment to the 
surrogate as violating the prohibition of monetary exchange, believing that any 
money exchanged for the child was the equivalent of baby-selling, which “is 
illegal and perhaps criminal.”68  The contract also violated adoption law because 
it allowed the arrangement to sidestep the requirement for a court to determine 
parental unfitness or find that abandonment requirements were met, and 
ignored the fact that under adoption law all agreements are revocable.  The 
court further determined that the contract was invalid because it violated New 
Jersey public policy,69 which looked to protect children from unnecessary 
separation from natural parents, ensuring that mother’s and father’s rights are 
accorded equal value.70 
The utilization of adoption law had a significant effect on the outcome of 
the case.  By accepting the analogy of surrogacy with adoption, the court was 
able to bypass any in-depth analysis about who the legal mother was.  
Operating on the premise that Mrs. Whitehead was the legal mother, the court 
turned to an analysis of whether there were grounds for terminating her 
parental rights, concluding that there was none.71  This decision had a direct 
impact on the viability of both parties’ assertions that their constitutional rights 
were violated.  While the court recognized that Federal Constitutional rights 
were involved—Mr. Stern did have a right to procreate and Ms. Whitehead had 
a right to companionship of her child—Mr. Stern’s right was not violated upon 
non-enforcement of the contract because he had indeed fathered a child, and Ms. 
Whitehead’s right to companionship of her child was not being violated since 
the court was not terminating her parental rights.72  With a non-enforceable 
contract and no violation of constitutional rights, the court applied the “best 
interests of the child” test and granted full custody to Mr. Stern.73  In doing so, 
the court was able to produce what it saw as the right outcome with respect to 
the best family for the child to be raised in—without disrupting established 
notions of motherhood or traditional ideas of family formation. 
The facts and events surrounding the Baby M case helped define how both 
lawmakers and the public perceived surrogacy and the consequent legal 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1234. 
 69. Id. at 1246. 
 70. Id. at 1247. 
 71. Id. at 1251-53. 
 72. Id. at 1253-55. 
 73. Id. 
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issues.74  Contributing to the public’s unease with surrogacy arrangements was 
the fact that reproductive technologies were rapidly changing and that there 
was a general lack of knowledge about how they worked.75  The court’s decision 
reinforced the emerging view of traditional surrogacy as an objectionable 
commercial arrangement that involved the sale of children and the exploitation 
of poor women.76  The outcome not only shaped the law in New Jersey, it also 
influenced judicial approaches and legislative debates in other states.  Prior to 
the hearing of Baby M in 1987, not one state had passed a statute regulating 
surrogacy contracts, and those legislatures that had begun discussing the issue 
leaned towards regulation, rather than prohibition, of contracts.77  Yet even 
before the New Jersey Supreme Court had issued their opinion, seventy bills 
regarding surrogacy were introduced in twenty-seven state legislatures.  By 
1988 six states had enacted statutes banning contracts or declaring them void.  
Other states passed laws during this period discouraging surrogacy 
arrangements by prohibiting monetary payment to surrogates or intermediaries 
or explicitly giving surrogates the right to rescind the contract after the birth of 
the child.78  Nonetheless, these fears largely subsided with the developments 
enabling gestational surrogacy. 
ii. Gestational Surrogacy 
During the era of Baby M, courts largely ignored the difference between 
traditional and gestational surrogacy because the technology making IVF 
successful was still being developed.  By 1993, however, gestational surrogacy 
had become much more familiar and was increasingly used by infertile 
couples.79  The negative stance taken by the public during Baby M subsided 
considerably,80 with narratives of baby-selling, exploitation, and 
commodification replaced by praise for surrogates giving an altruistic gift to 
infertile couples.81 Just five years after the Baby M decision, the California 
Supreme Court ruled very differently in the case of Johnson v. Calvert82 and 
paved the way for states to adapt their family law so as to account for the new 
technology making gestational surrogacy possible.83 
 
 74. Scott, supra note 17, at 116.  For example, opponents coined the expression “baby-selling” to 
describe surrogacy, a term that the New Jersey Supreme Court and lawmakers in other states picked 
up. 
 75. Id. at 126 (“[S]ome of the negative response to Baby M was driven by anxiety about the 
unfamiliar and uncertain risks associated with surrogacy and with the new reproductive 
technologies generally.”). 
 76. Id. at 117. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Scott, supra note 17, at 139; see also id. at 110 (stating that political and judicial responses to 
gestational surrogacy shifted towards more general acceptance as these branches recognized that 
parties continued to enter these agreements even without the guarantee of judicial enforcement). 
 80. Scott, supra note 17, at 120-21; see also, e.g., Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 47/1-75 (West 2009); Doe v. Roe, 717 A.2d 706 (Conn. 1998); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 
776 (Cal. 1993). 
 81. See Scott, supra note 17, at 121. 
 82. 851 P.2d 776. 
 83. See ARONS, supra note 1, at 27. 
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Utilizing the recently developed IVF technology, Mark and Crispina 
Calvert created an embryo using their own genetic material.  They entered into a 
contract with Anna Johnson, who agreed to be their gestational surrogate and 
relinquish her parental rights upon the birth of the child.  Increasing tension 
between the parties led Johnson to declare that she intended to keep the child.  
The Calverts filed suit, seeking a declaration that they were the legal parents of 
the unborn child.84  The Supreme Court of California was forced to determine: 
who is the legal mother when, pursuant to a surrogacy contract, an embryo 
formed by the gametes of a husband and wife is implanted in the uterus of 
another woman who then carries the resulting fetus to term and gives birth to a 
child not genetically related to her.85  Johnson argued that she was the legal 
mother because she gave birth to the child, while the Calverts argued that 
Crispina Calvert was the legal mother because she was both the genetic as well 
as the intended mother.86 
California had adopted the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA)87 and 
incorporated it into state law.88  According to the UPA, maternity can be proven 
by either a blood test establishing a genetic link or by having given birth.89  The 
court found that in adopting the UPA the California legislature had not 
provided a hierarchical preference for motherhood based on genetics versus 
gestation.90  The court held that because both women had presented proof of 
maternity, and the law gave no method for a tiebreaker, when genetic 
consanguinity and giving birth do not coincide in one woman the court should 
employ an intent test.91  Intent is determined by an examination of who was 
responsible for the initial fertilization of the embryo and who intended to raise 
the child.92  The intent test also became known as the “but for” test, with the 
court declaring that, “[b]ut for” the Calvert’s “acted-on intention, the child 
would not exist.”93  Because Crispina Calvert was the intended mother, she was 
also the legal mother. 
The court’s decision was differentiable from Baby M because it analyzed the 
case under an alternative legal framework.  The court held that because 
gestational surrogacy is distinguishable from traditional surrogacy, adoption 
law is not the appropriate rubric under which to examine the dispute, and thus 
the court did not need to adopt the rule established in Baby M.94  By discarding 
the adoption framework, the court was able to bypass the policy problems and 
find that surrogacy contracts are not contrary to California law.  To support this 
decision, the court found that the monetary payments to the surrogate were for 
 
 84. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778. 
 85. Id. at 777-78. 
 86. Id. at 779. 
 87. 1975 CAL. STAT. §§ 3196-3204 (now codified at CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7750 (West 2004 & 
Supp. 2011)). 
 88. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 781. 
 91. Id. at 782. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 784. 
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her services, not to relinquish parental rights to the child, and therefore 
gestational surrogacy agreements did not amount to baby-selling.  Nor did the 
court believe that surrogacy involved exploitation or commodification.  The 
court stated that, “there has been no proof that surrogacy contracts exploit poor 
women to any greater degree than economic necessity in general exploits them 
by inducing them to accept lower-paid or otherwise undesirable employment.”95  
It also acknowledged the role of a surrogate’s consent, asserting, “The argument 
that a woman cannot knowingly and intelligently agree to gestate and deliver a 
baby for intending parents carries overtones of the reasoning that for centuries 
prevented women from attaining equal economic rights . . . .”96 
Another important aspect of the court’s choice not to apply the adoption 
framework and instead to employ intent was that it avoided declaring the 
gestational surrogate the mother.  This decision had direct bearing on the 
parties’ ability to assert their respective constitutional claims.  In addressing the 
potential constitutional issues, the court found that because Johnson was not the 
legal mother, she had no constitutional right to companionship of the resulting 
child.  Rather, a surrogate is “not exercising her own right to make procreative 
choices; she is agreeing to provide a necessary and profoundly important 
service” to parents who “intended to procreate a child genetically related to 
them by the only available means.”97 
The Johnson decision had an acute impact on how the law regulating 
surrogacy and the subsequent enforcement of contracts was understood.  Many 
commentators saw the court’s use of the intent test as a positive step because it 
provided an unambiguous rule for establishing legal parenthood and assured 
parties to a surrogacy agreement of the intended outcome.98  Commentators also 
believed that going forward courts would move towards employing an intent 
test99 due to the development of IVF and gestational surrogacy,100 along with the 
attendant cultural shift.101  Overall, after Johnson people felt more confident that 
 
 95. Id. at 785; see also SCOTT B. RAE, THE ETHICS OF COMMERCIAL SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 57 
(1994) (stating that statistics do not indicate that surrogates are financially exploited.  Most 
surrogates are “women of moderate means” and “are clearly not destitute.”). 
 96. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 785. 
 97. Id. at 787. 
 98. See, e.g., John C. Sheldon, Surrogate Mothers, Gestational Carriers, and a Pragmatic Adaptation of 
the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000, 53 ME. L. REV. 523, 540 (2001) (“Procreative intent is the guiding 
principle that many academics favor in this field of law.”); Shultz, supra note 29, at 323 (“Within the 
context of artificial reproductive techniques, intentions that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, 
express and bargained-for ought presumptively to determine legal parenthood.”); Anderson, supra 
note 3, at 30 (“[T]he intent to create and raise a child should determine parentage when any form of 
assisted reproductive technology is utilized.”); Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal 
Framework for Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343, 2372 (1995) (“I favor determining legal 
parenthood according to the intent of the parties at the start of the arrangement and finding the 
contracting couple, and not the surrogate, to be the legal parents.”). 
 99. See Scott, supra note 17. 
 100. Id. at 121. 
 101. Id. at 120-21. 
Dana_paginated 9/7/2011  6:03:54 PM 
 DETERMINING LEGAL PARENTAGE FOR GAY FATHERS 369 
contracts would be enforceable and therefore felt more secure in using 
gestational surrogacy.102 
iii. A Hodge-podge of State Statutes 
While the Baby M decision attracted public attention and an outcry for state 
legislatures to pass laws forbidding surrogacy arrangements, few states 
ultimately did so.103  Those that did pass statutes generally did not distinguish 
between traditional and gestational surrogacy.104  Yet after the Johnson decision, 
state legislative decisions reflected the cultural shift towards intent and 
enforcing gestational surrogacy contracts.105  As a result, the current legal 
environment varies greatly,106 with states’ differing widely in their approach to 
traditional and gestational surrogacy laws.107  A few states have banned 
surrogacy agreements and created criminal penalties for participants.108  Some 
have simply refused to enforce surrogacy contracts.109  Others allow such 
contracts but will only enforce them if certain procedures have been followed.110  
For those states that do allow contracts, they vary on the terms that are 
permissible.  Regulations may include: only allowing compensation for 
“necessary” expenses; requiring a set time-period for the surrogate to terminate 
the agreement; requiring at least one intended parent to have a genetic link to 
the resulting child; and/or holding that a court must pre-approve the contract.  
Further, some state statutes require that the intended parents be married, 
precluding gay couples from legal protection if the surrogate breaks the 
contract.111  But most states are simply silent on parentage determinations in 
situations involving surrogacy arrangements.112 
In states without a statute addressing surrogacy, parties to a dispute over 
parentage must rely on a court’s determination.  Courts that have been asked to 
settle parentage have looked to a variety of established legal frameworks and 
applied these to surrogacy.  The frameworks include: adoption, custody, and 
 
 102. See id. at 122 (“Gestational surrogacy arrangements became standard, in part because they 
afforded legal certainty about the parental status of all parties to the surrogacy contract . . . .”). 
 103. See Scott, supra note 17, at 117. 
 104. Id. at 121. 
 105. See id. at 123 (citing the Illinois State Legislature’s passage of the Gestational Surrogacy Act 
(GSA) as similar to other contemporary laws that limit enforcement to gestational surrogacy 
contracts and require the intended parents to automatically become the child’s legal parents at 
birth.); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/15 (West 2009); FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (West 2010) (regulating 
gestational surrogacy). 
 106. ARONS, supra note 1, at 24. 
 107. See Appendix I. 
 108. Arizona and the District of Columbia prohibit all surrogacy contracts.  Florida, Kentucky, 
Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Utah, Virginia, and Washington ban payment to a 
surrogate.  See infra Appendix I. 
 109. Michigan and New York void and penalize surrogacy contracts; Indiana and Nebraska 
declare surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable; Kentucky, Louisiana, and North Dakota void 
traditional surrogacy contracts.  See id. 
 110. Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, 
and Washington regulate surrogacy.  See id. 
 111. ARONS, supra note 1, at 26. 
 112. See ARONS, supra note 10. 
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paternity,113 as well as tort, property, and contract law.114  The choice of 
frameworks determines which of four tests will be used to determine parentage: 
presumption, gestation, genetics, or intent.  Which test is utilized has direct 
bearing on the potential for gay homosexual couples to successfully assert 
parentage. 
iv. Gay Fathers Challenge Assumptions About the Law 
A recent New Jersey Superior Court decision, A.G.R. v. D.R.H. & S.H., 
illustrates four fundamental points: (1) commentators have been wrong to 
assume that the difference between traditional and gestational surrogacy is 
significant in every case; (2) an intent test is not necessarily the direction that all 
states are moving in; (3) there is a continued judicial bias towards gay fathers; 
(4) gay male couples are subject to unfair legal rules for determining parentage 
in gestational surrogacy agreements. 
In 1996 Donald Robinson Hollingsworth and his spouse, Sean 
Hollingsworth,115 used anonymous donor eggs and Sean’s sperm to create 
several embryos.  Angelia G. Robinson, Donald’s sister, agreed to be their 
gestational surrogate and signed a pre-birth agreement indicating she would 
relinquish her parental rights to the resulting child.  Twin girls were born in 
October of 2006 and lived with their two fathers for five months, but in March of 
2007 Ms. Robinson filed a lawsuit seeking custody.116 
The Superior Court determined that Baby M governed the case.  After 
addressing the public policy analysis used in Baby M and finding that the 
concerns remain applicable, the court held that the surrogacy contract was 
invalid.117  The court disagreed with the Hollingsworths’ contention that their 
case was distinguishable from Baby M because the surrogate had no genetic link 
to the resulting children.  As the court stated, “The lack of plaintiff’s genetic link 
to the twins [was], under the circumstances, a distinction without a difference 
significant enough to take the instant matter out of Baby M.”118  The court went 
on to ask whether it would “really make any difference if the word ‘gestational’ 
was substituted for the word ‘surrogacy’”119  The Judge responded that it did 
not.120 
The court resolved that New Jersey should not follow California’s approach 
on several grounds.  First, unlike in Johnson, the court did not need to “break a 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Storrow, supra note 3, at 606. 
 115. A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-09-1838-07, slip op. at 2 (N.J. Super. Cr. Ch. Div. Dec 23, 2009), 
available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20091231_SURROGATE.pdf 
(Couple was “legally married under California law . . . and registered their domestic partnership in 
New Jersey pursuant to the New Jersey Domestic Partnership Act, N.J.S.A. 26:8A-1 et seq.”). 
 116. See Stephanie Saul, New Jersey Judge Calls Surrogate Legal Mother of Twins, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30 
2009,  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/us/31surrogate.html; Nathan Koppel, Surrogacy 
Battles Expose Uneven Legal Landscape, WALL ST.  J., Jan. 15, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424052748704362004575000974247846294.html. 
 117. A.G.R., slip op. at 3. 
 118. Id. at 5. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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tie” between the intended mother and the birth mother, as here the intended 
parents were both men and therefore there was only one mother at issue.121  
Second, the court highlighted the differences between the New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s and the California Supreme Court’s views on public policy principles 
Because of the difference the court determined that it would be inappropriate to 
follow California or any other jurisdictions that limited gestational carrier’s 
rights.  The court’s analysis relied heavily on the assumption that the birth 
mother is a legal parent, as demonstrated by the court’s statement that 
surrogacy contracts are “directly contrary to the objectives of our laws” because 
contracts: guarantee that a child will be separated from its mother, allow 
adoption regardless of the suitability of the intended parents, ignore the best 
interests of the child, and take the child from the mother regardless of her 
maternal fitness.122  Reliance on these presumptions largely sidesteps the legal 
question of determining parentage because it takes for granted that the woman 
who gave birth to the child is the legal mother. 
In New Jersey no legislative action has been taken to enact a statute to 
regulate surrogacy contracts,123 thus, the judicial branch has significant control 
in determining the outcome of the case.  Further, any court can follow the New 
Jersey Superior Court’s line of reasoning and elect to view gestational surrogacy 
arrangements as no different from traditional surrogacy arrangements, thereby 
utilizing an adoption law framework and a gestational test to establish legal 
parentage.  This decision, however, negatively impacts gay male couples. 
II. STRUCTURAL INFERTILITY AND GAY FATHERS 
Today increasing numbers of gay and lesbian couples are raising children.  
Of almost 600,000 same-sex households, over fifty percent are raising children,124 
and of these, twenty-two percent are male couples.125  Overall the number of 
fathers raising children as the primary caregivers, including gay fathers, is 
growing.126  U.S. Census data showed that approximately one in twenty male 
same-sex couples were raising children in 1990; by 2000 this number had risen to 
one in five.127  Further, with legal battles over same-sex marriage asserting 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See Sonia Bychkov Green, Interstate Intercourse: How Modern Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies Challenge the Traditional Realm of Conflicts of Law, 24 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 25, 64 
(2009) (discussing the presence or absence of surrogacy statutes in the fifty states). 
 124. Jessica Hawkins, My Two Dads: Challenging Gender Stereotypes in Applying California’s Recent 
Supreme Court Cases to Gay Couples, 41 FAM. L.Q. 623, 623 (2007); see also TAVIA SIMMONS & MARTIN 
O’CONNELL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, MARRIED-COUPLE AND UNMARRIED-
PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000, at 9 (2003); M.V. LEE BADGETT & MARC A. ROGERS, INST. FOR GAY & 
LESBIAN STUDIES, LEFT OUT OF THE COUNT: MISSING SAME-SEX COUPLES IN CENSUS 2000 (2003) (stating 
that the number of same-sex households is probably higher than the census demonstrated, due to 
concerns about revealing one’s sexual orientation, confusion over the terms used on the forms, and 
lack of an appropriate option to be selected by same-sex couples). 
 125. Hawkins, supra note 123, at 631. 
 126. See Kauffman, supra note 24, at 24; GOLDBERG, supra note 24, at 50. 
 127. GOLDBERG, supra note 24, at 50 (“Importantly, these estimates were conservative and may 
have failed to capture a large number of lesbian- and gay-parent households by virtue of 
undercounting the number of same-sex couple households.”) (citation omitted). 
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homosexual couples’ right to enter into state recognized partnership 
arrangements, growing numbers of gays and lesbians are entering into these 
unions.  As increasing numbers do so, they will seek to have children.128  As a 
result of the increasing number of gay parents, the need to establish clear legal 
rules that support these relationships is imperative.129 
Homosexual couples have several options when considering parenthood.  
While some gay couples are able to adopt, many are prohibited from doing so 
by state or national laws.130  In addition, to assume that all gay couples view 
adoption as an adequate alternative to biological reproduction is unfair because 
this holds them to a different standard than their straight counterparts.  Some 
gay couples—like many prospective parents—desire biological reproduction 
that results in a child that is genetically related to one of them.131  For 
homosexual male couples, surrogacy is the only way they can have a child 
together that is genetically linked to one partner.132  Such an arrangement, 
 
 128. See id. (“[T]he number of lesbian- and gay-parent households is steadily increasing—a shift 
that corresponds to the increasing visibility of lesbian and gay parents in society.”); Robertson, supra 
note 17, at 324-25. 
 129. See Kauffman, supra note 24, at 24 (“[M]ore and more LGBT individuals and same-sex 
couples are consciously deciding to have children.”). 
 130. Adoption by a GLBT Parent, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http:// adoption.state.gov/ 
adoption_process/who_can_adopt/glbt.php (last visited May 29, 2011) (“Like all Americans 
considering adoption, gay and lesbian individuals (GLBT) and same-sex couples must comply with 
three sets of laws in order to adopt: U.S. federal law, the laws of the child’s country of origin, and the 
laws of your home U.S. state.  U.S. federal law does not prohibit gay and lesbian Americans or same-
sex couples from being an [sic] adoptive parent.  However, some countries do forbid gay and lesbian 
individuals, as well as same-sex couples, from adopting.  This is also true of some U.S. states.”); Who 
May Adopt, Be Adopted, or Place a Child for Adoption?: Summary of State Laws, CHILD WELFARE INFO. 
GATEWAY (2009), http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/ statutes/parties.cfm 
(“The statutory laws in most States are largely silent on the issue of adoption by gay and lesbian 
persons.  At this time, only two States, Florida and Mississippi, explicitly prohibit adoption by 
homosexuals in their statutes.  Utah bars adoption by persons who are cohabiting but not legally 
married; this language could be interpreted to encompass gay and lesbian adoptions.  In 
Connecticut, the sexual orientation of the prospective adoptive parent may be considered, 
notwithstanding provisions in the State’s laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.”). See also Darra L. Hofman, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s Maybe:” A State-by-State Survey of 
Surrogacy Laws and their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 449, 450 (2009) (“[U]ntil 
quite recently in the Western world . . . legal strictures limited [adoption] . . . to married 
heterosexuals.”); Kauffman, supra note 24, at 25 (“On the domestic front, it has become much easier 
in recent years to adopt as an openly gay individual or couple, although certainly in many 
jurisdictions adoptions are not possible.  For example, the Florida adoption statute explicitly 
prohibits adoptions by lesbians and gay men.  Internationally, no countries (of which this writer is 
aware) allow openly lesbian or gay couples to adopt.  Nonetheless, many single lesbians or gay men 
have successfully adopted from foreign countries.”); King, supra note 41, at 331 (“Family law, 
influenced by both heterosexism and homophobia, often precludes gays and lesbians from forming 
families of consent through other methods, such as adoption or foster parenting.”); GOLDBERG, supra 
note 24, at 69 (discussing varying practices among adoption agencies with respect to their acceptance 
of applications by same-sex couples). 
 131. Fred A. Bernstein, This Child Does Have Two Mothers . . . And a Sperm Donor with Visitation, 22 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 14 (1996) (“Believing adoption to be the appropriate route for every 
gay father ‘undervalues desires for a biological legacy—desires that have persisted across time, 
culture, race, and class.’”) (internal citation omitted). 
 132. Hawkins, supra note 123, at 623; Susan E. Dalton, From Presumed Fathers to Lesbian Mothers: 
Sex Discrimination and the Legal Construction of Parenthood, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 261, 321-22 (2003). 
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however, takes on heightened social and legal significance due to the already 
precarious legal position of these intimate relationships.133 
A.  Homophobia and Gender Bias Against Gay Male Parents 
Today, gay rights are gaining increasing momentum in the United States 
through legal and political challenges in multiple arenas,134 but heterosexism—
the belief that all people are or should be heterosexual—remains pervasive both 
socially and in our legal system.  Heterosexism is an ideological system that 
denies, denigrates, and stigmatizes all non-heterosexual forms of behavior, 
identity, or relationships.135  In the United States, heterosexuality is privileged in 
the social structures, laws, and norms governing society.136  Heterosexism is 
implicit in the family law arena regulating marriage, adoption, custody, and 
visitation—marginalizing gay and lesbian relationships and impacting the lives 
of gay couples and their children on a daily basis.137  While societal acceptance 
of the gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and queer (GLBTQ) community has 
increased in recent years, the law still lags behind when it comes to protecting 
the family relationships these individuals build.  This is particularly acute when 
it comes to the right to procreate and parent children, as the legal system has 
been slow to recognize families that do not fit the traditional heterogeneous 
structure.138 
 
 133. King, supra note 41, at 336. 
 134. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 994, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that 
Proposition 8 violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 
2008) (holding that Connecticut Constitution protects same-sex marriage); Goodridge v. Dep’t of 
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) (holding that a ban on same-sex marriage violates the 
Massachusetts Constitution); S. 115, 2009 Gen. Assem., 70th Sess. (Vt. 2009) (legislatively enacting 
same-sex marriage); Proposition 8 Cases, CAL. COURTS, http://www.courts.ca.gov/6464.htm.  See 
generally S. 4023, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 2965, 111th Cong. (2010); Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, 
and Domestic Partnerships, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/ 
subjects/s/same_sex_marriage/index.html (last updated Mar. 4, 2011) (documenting the recent 
events surrounding gay marriage such as Washington, D.C. joining Connecticut, Iowa, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont in issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, 
while California, New York, and Maine continue to battle over the issue); Charlie Savage & Sheryl 
Gay Stolberg, In Shift, U.S. Says Marriage Act Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/us/24marriage.html (detailing President Obama’s decision 
to declare that the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which bars federal recognition of same-sex 
marriages, is unconstitutional and that the Justice Department will no longer defend the law in 
court); Carl Hulse, Senate Repeals Ban Against Openly Gay Military Personnel, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/politics/19cong.html. 
 135. See generally Gregory M. Herek, Beyond “Homophobia”: Thinking About Sexual Prejudice and 
Stigma in the Twenty-First Century, SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y, Apr. 2004, at 6. 
 136. Mikel L. Walters, Invisible At Every Turn: An Examination of Lesbian 
Intimate Partner Violence at 14, 15 (Dec. 1, 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgia State 
University), available at http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/sociology_diss/42. 
 137. King, supra note 41, at 344; Timothy E. Lin, Social Norms and Judicial Decisionmaking: 
Examining the Role of Narratives in Same-Sex Adoption Cases, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 739, 741 (1999). 
 138. See generally Kauffman, supra note 24. 
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Implicit in heterosexism is the belief that families should be comprised of 
two heterosexual parents—a mother and a father.139  Narratives relying on 
stereotypes have been used to support this contention.  One narrative positions 
gay people as hyper-sexual beings; the other asserts that having same-sex 
parents is harmful to children’s psychological and social development.140  These 
narratives gained traction in the late 1980s within the context of foster parenting 
and adoption law.  Conservative groups helped push these views in the legal 
realm, and as a result states ended up passing marriage requirements that 
effectively barred homosexual couples from fostering children or banned 
outright adoption by gay couples.141 
These same arguments have been used in the context of surrogacy 
arrangements where the intended parents are a gay couple.  Opposition to state 
legislation that would enforce gestational surrogacy contracts—establishing the 
intended parents as the legal parents—comes from social and religious 
conservatives who oppose same-sex parenting.142  For example, in 2008 the 
Minnesota Legislature passed a bill that would have enforced gestational 
surrogacy contracts, but as a result of the Catholic Church’s opposition to the 
legislation and the Minnesota Family Council’s argument that the statute would 
promote same-sex parent households,143 the conservative Republican Governor 
at the time, Tim Pawlenty, vetoed the bill.144 
Conservatives argue that having same-sex parents is detrimental to 
children, but this is not supported by existing data.145  The American Academy 
of Pediatrics’ Committee on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family Health 
issued a report in 2002 that provided a comprehensive review of gay-parenting 
studies that all concluded there is no meaningful difference between children 
raised by gay parents and those raised by heterosexual parents.  The report 
 
 139. Narayan, supra note 24, at 83-84. 
 140. Lin, supra note 36, at 742-43. 
 141. NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES 
UNDER THE LAW 53 (2008) (stating that “Massachusetts changed its policy, issuing regulations that 
gave preference to married couples and made it almost impossible for lesbians and gay men to 
become foster parents,” that “New Hampshire became the second state with an adoption ban and 
the first with a legislatively mandated ban on gay foster parenting” and, that “[i]n 1987 President 
Ronald Reagan’s Interagency Task Force on Adoption recommended that ‘homosexual adoption 
should not be supported.’”). 
 142. Id. at 69-70, 77 (citing opposition to homosexual couples raising children as coming from the 
conservative “fatherhood movement” and the “marriage movement.”  Conservative organizations 
include the Institute for American Values, the National Fatherhood Initiative, and the Heritage 
Foundation.). 
 143. Scott, supra note 17, at 124; see also Mike Kaszuba, Group Says Surrogacy Bill Allows for “Baby-
Selling,” MINN.  STAR TRIB., Apr. 8, 2008, http://www.startribune.com/politics/17406454.html. 
 144. Human Rights Campaign, Minnesota Surrogacy Law, http://2fwww.hrc.org/ 
your_community/1074.html; Kevin Duchschere & Norman Draper, Pawlenty Vetoes Bills on Sick-
Leave Use, Surrogacy Contracts, MINN. STAR TRIBUNE, May 17, 2008, http://www.startribune.com/ 
politics/state/19013079.html?location_refer=$sectionName. 
 145. E.g., Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Access to Fertility Treatment By Gays, 
Lesbians, and Unmarried Persons, 92 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1190 (2009); GOLDBERG, supra note 24, at 12; 
POLIKOFF, supra note 140, at 73-75. 
. 
. 
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successfully debunked three of the main contentions.  The first, that gay and 
lesbian parents raise children differently, was found to be false because the 
studies revealed more similarities than differences in the parenting styles and 
attitudes of gay and non-gay fathers.  The second, that being raised by gay 
parents causes gender identity confusion in children, was found wholly 
inaccurate as none of the several hundred children studied showed signs of 
gender identity confusion, wished to be of the opposite sex, or engaged in cross-
gender behavior.  Further, no differences were found in the toy, dress, or 
friendship preferences of children with gay parents compared with those 
children of heterosexual parents.  The third, that children with same-sex parents 
suffer emotional and social problems, was found to be erroneous because no 
differences in personality, self-esteem, behavioral difficulties, academic success 
and quality of family relationships were found between children of homosexual 
and heterosexual parents.146 
Notwithstanding these studies, courts are not impervious to homophobic 
beliefs rooted in the notion that heterosexual relationships are the best 
environment for rearing children.147  As one scholar argues, “courts have 
generally treated ART cases involving same-sex couples differently from ART 
cases involving different-sex couples.  This difference in treatment is attributable 
to some combination of institutional discomfort with same-sex families and 
concern over the legal implications of recognizing two mothers or two fathers 
for the same child.”148 
Alongside the privileging of heterosexual relationships is the adulation of 
women as mothers.  Men generally, but gay men in particular, face a deep-
seated cultural belief that men cannot be good nurturers or caretakers of 
children.149  While the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the maternal 
relationship is more important than the paternal relationship with a child,150 it 
did acknowledge that such gender stereotypes remain prevalent in society.151  It 
has been suggested that this is the reason that surrogacy produces such social 
and political antagonism; by decoupling the biological process from the social 
and legal definition, surrogacy challenges the fundamental categories of 
“woman” and of “mother”152 as established by the ‘natural’ method of 
 
 146. Brad Sears & Alan Hirsch, Heterosexuals Not Only People with Good Parenting Skills, DAILY 
REV., Apr. 8, 2004, http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/press/heterosexuals.html; Ellen C. 
Perrin & Comm. on Psychosocial Aspects of Child & Family Health, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, 
Technical Report: Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Parents, 109 PEDIATRICS 341, 342-43. 
 147. See POLIKOFF, supra note 140, at 73. 
 148. Deborah H. Wald, supra note 20, at 392. 
 149. GOLDBERG, supra note 24, at 52; Hawkins, supra note 123, at 631. 
 150. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979) (noting that the tender-years doctrine may 
still apply, resulting in a maternal relationship being more important when the child is young). The 
tender-years doctrine presumed that the mother was the best legal guardian of young children.  
While held unconstitutional based on sex discrimination, it was replaced with similar tests including 
the primary-caregiver test and the continuity-of-care test, both of which typically favor women who 
remain the primary caretakers of children in a heterosexual relationship.  See Martha A. Field, 
Surrogate Motherhood, in PARENTHOOD IN MODERN SOCIETY 223, 231 (John Eekelaar & Petar Šarčević 
eds., 1993). 
 151. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003). 
 152. Hofman, supra note 129, at 452. 
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reproduction.153  It is the question of how to attend to this decoupling that has 
preoccupied every court forced to analyze a surrogacy arrangement. 
The law is a method by which to maintain and reinforce what is often taken 
as static: the social relationships that qualify as ‘natural.’154  Biological 
reproduction was the ‘natural’ way to determine parentage, but the 
technological advances used in surrogacy arrangements meant that biology—
and the existing laws using biology to establish parenthood—could no longer be 
relied on.  Courts, however, continue to try and recreate this idea of natural 
reproduction.155  As scholar Valerie Hartouni says: 
[B]oth [the Baby M and Johnson] surrogacy rulings work . . . to restabilize as a 
matter of (natural) fact what they also both presuppose and compel into being.  
Each ruling, in other words, must contain and rehabilitate alternative stories of 
origins and kinship.  And one of the ways both accomplish this is by retelling 
these stories in a register that renders them variations on an original story, 
typically, a highly sentimentalized story of heterosexual love, yearning, and 
procreative desire.156 
One of the way courts have achieved the reconstruction of natural 
parentage is to adjust traditional legal doctrine so as to account for alternative 
family formations “while maintaining the fundamental premises of the older 
law.”157  The problem is that this approach is not possible when gay couples—
particularly gay men—use surrogacy to procreate because they challenge every 
established conception of natural reproduction. 
Surrogacy has been described as the male equivalent of donor 
insemination, which can be utilized by lesbian couples—but this analogy 
ignores the fact that unlike AI, hiring a surrogate is a complex, expensive, and 
legally precarious process.158  It also ignores the emphasis that is given to the 
biological process of gestation and the role of mothers.  As one scholar correctly 
 
 153. See ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
SEXUALITY 5-7, 27 (2007).  Sterling’s work makes it clear that what is traditionally known as “natural” 
or “biological” is socially constructed.  She says: “In most public and most scientific discussions, sex 
and nature are thought to be real, while gender and culture are seen as constructed.  But these are 
false dichotomies.”  Id. at 27.  Instead, she suggests that, “what we call ‘facts’ about the living world 
are not universal truths [but] ‘are rooted in specific histories, practices, languages and peoples.’”  Id. 
at 7.  The very “truths” that are created by scholars and biologists are informed by the “political, 
social, and moral struggles about our cultures and economies.”  Id.  at 5.  What is considered 
“natural” is then deemed “normal” and anything outside of that is heteronormative and deviant.  
See id. at 76.  While historically the body and the biological process of heterosexual reproduction 
have been deemed “natural” and “normal,” the development of ARTs challenged this notion.  IVF 
and surrogacy allowed for the disaggregation of reproduction into genetic, gestational, and social 
roles.  As a result, society was forced to reconsider established ideas about women’s bodies and the 
heterosexual process required to give birth.  In short, ARTs challenged normativity by 
denaturalizing the process of reproduction.  As part of this, ARTs were set up in opposition to what 
was seen as “natural” procreation, the process achieved through sexual intercourse between a man 
and a woman. 
 154. VALERIE HARTOUNI, CULTURAL CONCEPTIONS: ON REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE 
REMAKING OF LIFE 25 (1997). 
 155. See id. at 20. 
 156. Id. at 19-20. 
 157. Meyer, supra note 37, at 376. 
 158. Bernstein, supra note 130, at 14-15. 
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notes, “No gay man who employs a surrogate can be assured of success . . . . 
[H]ad the father of ‘Baby M.’ . . . been gay, he would not have stood a chance of 
obtaining custody from [the surrogate].”159  This opinion is in part due to 
enduring social stigma against gay couples, but it is also a direct result of the 
existing legal rules for establishing legal parentage.  Without another woman to 
step in to be the child’s mother, a surrogate will not be viewed as a “surrogate 
uterus; she [will be] the mother.”160  If a surrogate breaks the contract and 
asserts her parental rights, gay male couples face an even higher bar than 
heterosexual couples in establishing legal parenthood. 
B.  Judicial Determinations of Legal Parentage for Male Homosexual Couples 
Due to the fundamental biological differences between men and women, 
homosexual male and female couples face somewhat different issues when it 
comes to the methods for procreating and establishing legal parentage upon the 
birth of a child.  Lesbians who wish to procreate have two options: (1) using 
artificial insemination and donor sperm, one partner can get pregnant and give 
birth to a child, or (2) utilize IVF, where one partner’s egg is combined with 
donor sperm and the resulting embryo is implanted in the other partner.161  In 
the first scenario, some courts have held that based on the marital 
presumption—meaning Partner A consented to Partner B’s artificial 
insemination—Partner A is also legally a second parent.162  With respect to the 
second option, states have held that one woman is the legal mother due to a 
genetic link and the other woman is a legal mother due to gestation and birth.163  
In these states lesbians do not have to resort to second parent adoption164 to 
establish parentage upon the birth of the child.  Both options create loopholes 
for lesbians that allow both intended parents to be declared the legal mothers.  
Because men cannot biologically gestate, neither option is available to them.  
Additionally, no matter which method a lesbian couple chooses, unless both 
women are unable to carry a child to term and therefore must hire a surrogate, 
there is no third party to assert parental rights.  Because of clearly established 
 
 159. Id. at 16. 
 160. Id. (quoting Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to 
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO L.J. 459, 469 
(1990)). 
 161. Kauffman, supra note 24, at 24. 
 162. See Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 662 (Cal. 2005) (holding that “a woman who agreed to 
raise children with her lesbian partner [and] supported her partner’s artificial insemination using an 
anonymous donor . . . is the children’s parent”); see also Meyer, supra note 37, at 378 (“In the small 
minority of states which currently permit same-sex marriage, domestic partnerships, or civil unions, 
same-sex partners or spouses can avail themselves of a presumption of parentage based on the 
traditional marital presumption . . . .”). 
 163. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 678 (Cal. 2005) (holding that “K.M. is a parent of the twins 
because she supplied the ova that produced the children” and that the law stating that a sperm 
donor is not the legal father “does not apply because K.M. supplied her ova to impregnate her 
lesbian partner in order to produce children who would be raised in their joint home.”). 
 164. Second-parent adoption is when the gay partner of a biological parent is able to adopt the 
child and thereby considered the second parent to the child.  See Lin, supra note 136, at 740 n.6; 
POLIKOFF, supra note 140, at 53. 
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state rules holding that sperm donors are not legal parents,165 and the ability for 
lesbians to use an anonymous donor, lesbians do not face the same risks as gay 
male couples. 
Due to biological differences between the genders, a homosexual male 
couple that wishes to procreate together must hire a surrogate; it is impossible for 
a surrogate to be anonymous, therefore a third party is always present to assert 
a competing claim of parentage.166  Assuming that one partner supplies the 
sperm, the law will recognize him as the biological and legal father of the 
resulting child.  The non-biological partner has no parental rights unless he is 
able to execute a second parent adoption, which only some states allow.167  
Second parent adoptions require waiting until after the child is born and the 
proceeding lasts approximately six to ten months, with no guarantee that a court 
will permit the adoption.168  Further, if the surrogate chooses to assert her legal 
right as the child’s mother, a second parent adoption is impossible and therefore 
the intended father with no genetic connection has no actual legal rights over 
the child.  The outcome is a child who has a mother and a father who never 
contemplated parenting together, and a spouse whose desire to be a father is 
frustrated by the law. 
C.  In Light of Judicial Bias and Unfair Legal Tests A.G.R. was Decided 
Incorrectly 
The judge in A.G.R. was wrong in his determination that the difference 
between traditional surrogacy and gestational surrogacy is “a distinction 
without a difference significant enough to take the instant matter out of Baby 
M.”169  As has been established above, gestational surrogacy is fundamentally 
different from traditional surrogacy because the child has no genetic link to the 
surrogate.  A woman who agrees to be a gestational surrogate makes a 
calculated choice to not use her own eggs, instead seeking a role analogous to 
 
 165. States have held that anonymous sperm donors are not legal parents.  Because of clearly 
established rules regarding donor sperm, this paper will not address the issue of third party sperm 
or egg donors. 
 166. See Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 577 n.3 (Mass. 2004) (Sossman, J.)  
(“Applying [the presumption] to same-sex couples results in some troubling anomalies: applied 
literally, the presumption would mean very different things based on whether the same-sex couple 
was comprised of two women as opposed to two men.”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting) (“Whereas the relationship between mother and 
child is demonstratively and predictably created and recognizable through the biological process of 
pregnancy and childbirth, there is no corresponding process for creating a relationship between 
father and child.”); Appleton, supra note 23, at 264-65 (stating that the presumption rule “might 
extend only to lesbian couples and not to gay male couples” because “the complications that the 
need for a third-party woman poses for gay male couples” do not exist for lesbian couples). 
 167. Only about half the states permit same-sex second-parent adoption.  States include 
Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Connecticut.  See Stephanie 
Francis Cahill, Making Sure Mommy and Mommy Get Custody, 38 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, Oct. 4, 2002, 6; 
Meyer, supra note 37, at 378. 
 168. See Hawkins, supra note 123, at 636. 
 169. A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-09-1838-07, slip op. at 5 (N.J. Super. Cr. Ch. Div. Dec 23, 2009), 
available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20091231_SURROGATE.pdf. 
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that of an incubator.170  The judge in A.G.R. relied on ideas and arguments that 
are outdated as a result of technological and social shifts. 
The fact that the judge did not find the difference significant intimates that 
there is enduring judicial discrimination against homosexuals.  While the judge 
was required to adhere to the precedent established in Baby M, this earlier 
decision did not address the issue of gestational surrogacy, a technology that 
was just emerging at the time and not at issue in the case.  Thus, the judge in 
A.G.R. was free to follow Johnson’s decision that adoption is not applicable in 
gestational surrogacy cases because the surrogate has no genetic link to the child 
and would not have become pregnant via the biological father without an 
agreement that she would not assert parental rights over any resulting children.  
The fact that gestational surrogacy arrangements have been described as “so 
widely accepted as to be almost mundane”171 suggests that what was really 
operating in this decision was cultural discomfort over two fathers. 
The decision also highlights the significant cultural value that is still 
accorded to women as the role of mother.  In disputed cases such as A.G.R., 
where the intended parents are a homosexual male couple in a partnership and 
one partner is the genetic donor, the circumstances arguably fall within the 
framework of Johnson.  The genetic donor is a legal father; however, the other, 
non-biological partner must contend with the surrogate for the status of legal 
parent.  The surrogate claims parental rights on the fact that she gestated the 
child, and the partner claims parental status based on both intent and 
presumption via marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership.  Like Crispina 
Calvert, the non-biological partner has two bases for being the parent, compared 
to the surrogate’s sole basis as the gestational carrier.  Notwithstanding the fact 
that the term ‘parent’ must be substituted for ‘mother,’ it is clear that here the 
intended parent should trump the surrogate.  The fact that the intended parent 
did not succeed indicates the law’s unwillingness to fully embrace diverse 
family forms. 
III. ANALYSIS OF LEGAL TESTS IN LIGHT OF GAY FATHERS AND WHY THE INTENT 
TEST IS PROPER 
As the above section makes clear, the market for surrogacy continues to 
exist and proliferate despite the risks of establishing legal parenthood.  In 
addition, the concerns voiced in Baby M and echoed in A.G.R. have not 
materialized.  What is apparent is that the variation between states’ laws and the 
fear of non-enforceability has given rise to uncertainty for those couples that 
choose to undertake a surrogacy arrangement.  The following Section analyzes 
the possible legal tests for establishing parenthood, concluding that a pure intent 
test is the best rule. 
 
 170. See Sanger, supra note 40, at 75. 
 171. Krawiec, supra note 4, at 206. 
Dana_paginated 9/7/2011  6:03:54 PM 
380 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 18:353 2011 
A.  Analysis of Legal Tests for Establishing Parenthood 
i. Marital Presumption 
Traditionally the law established parentage based on a procreative 
connection to the child.  Determining who was the mother was considered 
relatively easy and was based on the biological process of gestation and giving 
birth.172  Paternity, however, was more complicated and was established on the 
basis of a marital presumption: a husband was automatically the legal father of 
any children born to his wife during their marriage.173  This rule persists today 
in every state in various forms.174 
Presumption operates in a gendered way.  For example, a married man is 
the legal father of any children his wife gives birth to, but a married woman is 
not the legal mother of her husband’s biological children that are born to 
another woman.175  What has emerged through statute or common law is the 
establishment of a presumption of fatherhood that trumps genetics or intent.  
Presumption exists even if AI is used and the husband has no genetic link to the 
child.176 
A recent push to create gender-neutral laws has created a loophole for 
lesbian women.  Several state courts have applied the presumption rule to 
lesbian couples, demonstrating that presumption does not have to apply solely 
to fathers.177  A woman who agrees to her lesbian partner being artificially 
inseminated is presumed to be the second parent.  What this implies is that 
neither a genetic link nor giving birth to the child is required for establishing 
 
 172. Meyer, supra note 37, at 371. 
 173. E.g. Appleton, supra note 23, at 232-33. 
 174. See Bowen, supra note 7, at 13 (2008) (The four forms are: “(1) a significant but not totally 
insurmountable irrefutable presumption; (2) a rebuttable presumption, if to do so is in the child’s 
best interests; (3) a rebuttable presumption that is triggered at the time of divorce regardless of the 
length of the parent-child relationship, or whether it would be in the best interests of the child; and 
(4) a rebuttable presumption available to anyone who believes he is the parent to the child in 
question.”). 
 175. Appleton, supra note 23, at 237 (emphasis added). 
 176. Bowen, supra note 7, at 12. 
 177. See Appleton, supra note 23, at 241-42 (noting two decisions, one from Vermont and the Elisa 
B. case from California); Anderson, supra note 3, at 49-51 (Elisa B. v. Superior Court was a child-
support case involving a lesbian couple.  Prior to conception, the two women manifested intent to 
raise the children together.  When separating, Elisa denied being the parent of the twins who had 
been born to her former partner in order to avoid being liable for child support.  The trial court held 
that Elisa was a legal parent, but the Court of Appeals overturned the decision based on the Uniform 
Parentage Act and the decision in Johnson v. Calvert, which held that a child can only have one 
natural mother.  On subsequent appeal, the California Supreme Court clarified its holding in 
Johnson, stating that the rule that a child can have only one natural mother was limited to a dispute 
where there were two potential mothers and a father, creating three potential parents.  In the case at 
hand, the claim was solely between two mothers, so California will allow the statute relating to 
fatherhood to be used to determine a second mother as well.  As a result, because Elisa treated the 
children as her own, actively participating in their conception and holding them out as her children, 
she had accepted the rights and obligations of parenthood.  Because there was no competing claim 
both women were legal mothers.). 
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legal motherhood.  Decisions applying the marital presumption to lesbians 
invite an extension of the rule—applying it to all same-sex relationships.178 
The problem is how the extension of presumption to gay male partners in a 
consent scenario works in practice given that men cannot gestate and give birth.  
Analyzing this issue highlights how the rule operates differently depending on 
the biological roles required, which ultimately hinge on gender, an outcome that 
states actively avoid.179  In situations where a woman’s partner—whether it is a 
man or a woman—agrees to her being impregnated by a third party’s sperm, the 
sperm donor is essentially invisible.  The state will apply the presumption rule 
to the husband, holding that he is the father, or the lesbian partner, holding that 
she is the second mother.  Therefore the state should theoretically also recognize 
a gay male partner who consents to his partner impregnating a surrogate as the 
child’s second father.  But because surrogates are actively involved in the nine-
month biological process, the law does not see them as invisible and therefore 
has never applied the presumption rule to homosexual male couples. 
Making the presumption rule the default rule is inappropriate because it is 
inherently unfair in how it treats the sexes, basing the ability of individuals to 
establish legal parentage on gender and sexual orientation.180  Additionally, the 
presumption rule could be argued as violating the Equal Protection Clause 
because it benefits lesbian couples without doing the same for gay men.181  For 
these reasons presumptive parenthood does not adequately address the new 
legal issues created by surrogacy. 
ii. Gestation 
Despite the fact that most legal systems base maternity on the principle of 
mater semper certa est, meaning the woman who gives birth to the child is the 
legal mother,182 this Article has argued that using gestation as the test for 
determining the legal mother is wrong because it precludes those who utilize a 
surrogate.  An additional point is that such a test is not gender-neutral.  While 
not discounting the bond that forms between a woman and the child in utero, 
using a gestational approach relies on reproductive biology and reinforces 
 
 178. See Bowen, supra note 7, at 14-15.  See generally Hawkins, supra note 123. 
 179. See Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 577 n.3 (Mass. 2004) (Sossman, J.) 
(stating that for lesbians the presumption rule can be extended, therefore policy reasoning calls for 
the presumption rule to also extend to same-sex male couples.  The problem is how to apply it to gay 
male couples since they have to resort to surrogacy.  Justice Sossman recognized that established 
rules regarding presumption differ for male and female homosexual couples, saying: “Applying 
these concepts to same-sex couples results in some troubling anomalies: applied literally, the 
presumption would mean very different things based on whether the same-sex couple was 
comprised of two women as opposed to two men.  For the women, despite the necessary 
involvement of a third party, the law would recognize the rights of the “mother” who bore the child 
and presume that the mother’s female spouse was the child’s ‘father’ or legal ‘parent.’  For the men, 
the necessary involvement of a third party would produce the exact opposite result—the biological 
mother of the child would retain all her rights, while one (but not both) of the male spouses could 
claim parental rights as the child’s father.”). 
 180. Appleton, supra note 23, at 265. 
 181. See id. 
 182. Ingeborg Schwenzer, Introduction to TENSIONS BETWEEN LEGAL, BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL 
CONCEPTIONS OF PARENTAGE, supra note 37, at 1, 2. 
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societal stereotypes of women as the only parent who can effectively nurture a 
child.  Some courts support this contention by suggesting that gestation is not as 
valuable as the law has made it out to be, rather gestation was simply the best 
evidence of a genetic link prior to the advent of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
tests.183 
iii. Genetic Relationship 
While some courts have turned to using genetics as the determining factor 
in establishing parenthood, this fails to adequately take into account the 
changing face of families that include step-parents, adoptive parents, and 
parents created through ARTs.  Such a test also challenges the established rule 
that an egg or sperm donor in a surrogacy situation, while genetically linked to 
the child that is produced, is not the legal parent.  Reliance on a genetics test 
would also raise the question of why such a test would be employed solely in 
the realm of surrogacy rather than all fertility practices.184  Additionally, a 
genetics test becomes increasingly complicated now that recent technological 
advances have created the potential for a child to be genetically linked to two 
women through ooplasmic transfer,185 resulting in a baby that that is genetically 
related to three people.186  The employment of a genetic test by the courts leaves 
room for new substantive legal problems to arise down the road.  As a result, a 
test that relies on genetics also fails to provide a suitable rule for determining 
parentage in gestational surrogacy arrangements. 
B.  Intent is the Proper Test for Determining Legal Parentage 
Using a pure-intent test as the default rule for gestational surrogacy 
arrangements is not as innovative as some legal scholars claim.187  While on its 
face the law maintains that parentage is based on the biological process of 
procreation, it is clear that the law establishing paternity is socially 
constructed.188  What follows are the numerous arguments for why intent is the 
better method for determining parentage in gestational surrogacy arrangements 
than any rule that is currently in operation. 
Procreation through the use of IVF, donor eggs, and a gestational surrogate 
requires intent; it involves a significant financial and emotional investment, and 
is time-consuming.189  “But for” the intentions and actions of this couple, the 
 
 183. See Storrow, supra note 3, at 617 (stating that Belsito v. Clark is one example of a case that 
deemphasized the role of gestation in determining parentage). 
 184. Katherine M. Swift, Parenting Agreements, the Potential Power of Contract, and the Limits of 
Family Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 925 (2007). 
 185. World’s First Genetically Altered Babies Born, CNN.COM (May 5, 2001), http:// 
archives.cnn.com/2001/TECH/science/05/05/US.genes/ (“[O]oplasmic transfer . . . involves 
taking the contents of a donor egg from a fertile female and injecting it into the infertile woman’s egg 
along with the fertilizing sperm from her mate.”). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Andrews, supra note 100, at 2370. 
 188. Id. at 2370-71. 
 189. Shultz, supra note 29, at 324. 
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child would not exist.190  As a result, the couple’s intent to raise the child should 
override the claims made by a gestational surrogate for parental rights.191  It is 
arguable that this method provides children with the “best and most 
committed” parents, given that those who performed the major tasks in creating 
the child exercised a deep desire for the child.192  Further, an intent test is the 
best method to clarify legal parenthood prior to any significant actions being 
undertaken by either party—namely the creation of a new life. 
Determination of parental status prior to the birth of the child is in the best 
interest of the child because it clarifies adult-child relationships from the 
beginning of the child’s life.  It enables intending parents to exercise parental 
authority and receive legal recognition of their functional status throughout the 
entire course of the child’s life.193  It also prevents disputes over custody, which 
can affect parental bonding and cause emotional and/or psychological trauma 
for the child depending on the length of time the dispute remains unsettled.194 
The intent test provides a legal remedy for whom to hold responsible in the 
unfortunate circumstance that nobody wants the resulting child.195  Because 
intent manifests legal parenthood prior to the child’s birth, the state can hold the 
intended parents legally and financially responsible for the child even if they no 
longer wish to raise the child.  This outcome is supported by states’ interest in 
having all children be financially supported.196  An intent test also protects 
surrogates who entered into the arrangement in the expectation that another 
party will care for the child upon its birth.  It is unfair to hold the gestational 
mother legally responsible for a child she did not want, did not intend to parent, 
and is not genetically related to. 
Utilizing an intent test eliminates inequalities in how the law operates.  
Relying on intent abolishes gender distinctions and inequalities based on sexual-
partner preference in determining a child’s legal parents, thus an intent test 
applies in the same way to everyone.197  Intent is also the only rule that allows 
all couples, including homosexual male couples, to legally establish 
parentage.198  Interestingly, intent is used to determine parental status in all 
 
 190. See Appleton, supra note 23, at 277-78 (“[I]ntentions that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, 
express and bargained-for ought presumptively to determi-ne legal parenthood . . .  [because they] 
constitute a but-for cause of the existence of the very child in question . . . .”). 
 191. Hawkins, supra note 123, at 634-35. 
 192. King, supra note 41, at 378. 
 193. See id. at 360-70. 
 194. Id. at 378. 
 195. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998) (where neither the 
surrogate nor the intended parents wanted the resulting child). 
 196. Meyer, supra note 37, at 381 (“The assumed tie between biological reproduction and 
parental responsibility remains particularly strong in the law of child support.”). 
 197. See Appleton, supra note 23, at 277-78 (“[R]elying on intent to determine parentage holds 
promise for freeing family law from gender stereotypes and assumptions about biology as destiny.  
An intent-based test puts males and females on equal footing, offsetting rather than reinforcing 
biological sex differences and offering…‘an opportunity for gender neutrality.’”) (internal citation 
omitted); Andrews, supra note 100, at 2345 (“Contract law can also counteract some of the 
deficiencies that have been identified with family law, such as the fact that it tends to recognize only 
one type of family: the male-led heterosexual couple with children.”). 
 198. See Hawkins, supra note 123, at 635. 
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other forms of ARTs including sperm donation, egg donation, and embryo 
donation.199  To utilize an intent approach for all collaborative reproductive 
arrangements except surrogacy lacks common sense—and instead hints at the 
lingering presumption that women make better parents than men.200 
While states have passed legislation acknowledging intent as one factor, 
they have not recognized parenthood by pure intention alone.201  Instead states 
continue to reaffirm the requirement in Johnson that there be a tie between two 
competing mothers.202  The effect is that homosexual male couples cannot legally 
guarantee that they will co-parent a child intentionally conceived and born out 
of a gestational surrogacy arrangement.  Therefore a pure intent test, one that 
looks solely at the intent of all parties when they entered into an agreement, 
must be used.  Given that technology is rapidly changing in ways that give rise 
to new legal problems, a pure intent is also the only test that will be able to 
withstand such changes.203 
It has been argued that intent is difficult to discern because it requires a 
court to determine a mental state,204 but contractual agreements are an easy way 
to establish the intent of all parties involved.  Contract law is governed by clear 
and established rules.205  Under contract theory, if force, duress, fraud, or 
misrepresentation is involved, the contract cannot be enforced.  As a result, if a 
woman was coerced into acting as surrogate, or there was unequal bargaining 
power, the contract would be nullified and the surrogate would retain parental 
status.206  State legislatures are also free to institute laws governing surrogacy 
contracts in order to ensure that intent is established and/or address specific 
concerns.  Further, contracts governing intent allow room for the current 
complex and readily evolving family structures.207  Through a contract 
manifesting intent parties would have the ability to select from state sanctioned 
options including three parents,208 two mothers, etcetera. 
 
 199. See Appleton, supra note 23, at 281. 
 200. See id. at 267-68. 
 201. Storrow, supra note 3, at 643-44 (noting that some states, such as Florida, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, and Virginia, have passed statutes in the surrogacy context that recognize the 
parenthood of intending parents under certain circumstances, but these statutes all include 
provisions requiring that at least one of the intending parents to be a genetic parent of the child and 
that the intending parents be married to each other). 
 202. Id. at 644 (“These statutes fail to provide an opportunity for parenthood by pure intention 
and instead seem to respond to the fragmentation of parenthood by forcing a tie between gestational 
and genetic parenthood and breaking the tie by locating intentional parenthood in a genetic 
contributor, one of the spouses of a married couple.  In this way, the statutes validate the outcome of 
Johnson v. Calvert.”). 
 203. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 54-55. 
 204. Appleton, supra note 23, at 283. 
 205. For a more in-depth analysis of arguments supporting contractual enforcement see Richard 
A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2308 (1995). 
 206. See generally Swift, supra note 183. 
 207. See King, supra note 41, at 379. 
 208. Currently Pennsylvania is the only state that recognizes three parents.  Elizabeth 
Marquardt, Op-Ed., When 3 Really is a Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/07/16/opinion/16marquardt.html. 
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Another important aspect of the intent test is how it circumvents the 
competing constitutional claims of procreative liberty (alleged by the intended 
parents) versus the right to companionship of one’s child (averred by the 
surrogate).  Problems arise when the right to procreate runs up against the right 
to parent one’s child.  Courts look for ways to avoid violation of either right; in 
the surrogacy context this can be achieved in various ways based on which test 
is used.  The test has a direct impact on which party’s assertion of a 
constitutional right is successful and impacts whether both members of a gay 
male couple can be legally declared the parents of the resulting child. 
In Baby M, the father’s right to procreate was not violated by the 
determination that the surrogate was the legal mother.  For gay couples, this 
holding implies that, while one person can procreate, their chosen partner 
cannot legally co-parent the child as the gestational surrogate will retain that 
right if she decides to contest the contract.  Thus, a court must determine the 
breadth of the right to procreate when both the intended parents are men and 
hence physically unable to biologically engender a child together.  If a court 
were to determine that both men have the right to procreate through the use of a 
surrogate, the court must also consider what happens when the right to 
procreate conflicts with the right to parent one’s child as would be the case if the 
surrogate asserted parental rights.  While one option would be for the Supreme 
Court to declare one constitutional right trumps the other, this is unlikely to 
occur in the context of gay couples, and is objectionable given the decision’s 
dangerous ramifications for other areas of the law. 
Instead, the decision in Johnson demonstrates why utilization of an intent 
test is imperative for gay male couples.  The California Supreme Court was able 
to circumvent the two competing constitutional rights by declaring that the 
surrogate was not a legal parent and therefore had no right to companionship of 
the child.  Only by bypassing this debate can both parties in a same-sex male 
couple be declared the intended parents without violating a third party’s 
constitutional rights.  In Johnson, however, intent was only applied after the 
court found a tie between two mothers.  This demonstrates the fundamental 
problem for gay men facing a contested legal battle with a surrogate—there is 
no way to create a “tie” if the term parent is not substituted for mother.  In order 
for courts to avoid a surrogate’s claim to the right to parent one’s child, the court 
must determine that she is not a legal parent.  The only way this is possible is 
through a pure intent test that recognizes two fathers’ intention to be the legal 
parents of a child born through gestational surrogacy. 
 IV. CONCLUSION 
ARTs have given rise to new methods of procreation, challenging 
normative assumptions about biological reproduction and produced vexing 
legal questions about how to determine parentage.  Unsure of how to address 
these issues, the law has applied a wide variety of tests, engendering great 
uncertainty about who will be declared the legal parents.  Despite hope that 
courts and legislatures were moving towards an intent framework for cases of 
gestational surrogacy, it is clear that this is not the case.  Current frameworks 
discriminate against homosexual male couples, making it nearly impossible for 
them to ensure they are declared the legal parents if a surrogate asserts her right 
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to parent.  To avoid these undesirable results, courts and state legislatures need 
to begin employing a pure intent test.  Only through this method can the law 
keep up with society’s expanding definition of the family and recognize 





States that have passed laws regarding surrogacy.209 
 
BANS 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2007). Arizona 
Arizona prohibits all surrogacy contracts, whether paid or unpaid, declares the 
surrogate as the legal mother entitled to custody, and establishes a rebuttable 
presumption that the surrogate’s husband, if the surrogate is married, is the father. 
D.C. CODE §§ 16-401 to 16-402 (2001). District of Columbia 
The District of Columbia prohibits all surrogacy contracts, declaring them 
unenforceable.  Violations are punishable up to a $10,000 fine and/or 1 year in 
prison. 
VOIDS AND PENALIZES 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.851-.861 (West 2002). Michigan 
Michigan prohibits all surrogacy contracts.  A party to a surrogacy contract is 
criminally liable for a misdemeanor punishable by a fine up to $10,000 and/or 1 
year in jail.  Someone who induces or arranges such an agreement is guilty of a 
felony carrying up to a $50,000 fine and/or 5 years in jail.  The same punishment 
applies to anyone involved in an arrangement with a surrogate who is an 
unemancipated minor, mentally ill, or suffers from a developmental or mental 
disability.  As a further disincentive, if a custody dispute arises, the person who has 
physical custody (likely the birth mother) may retain it until a court orders 
otherwise. 
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121-24 (McKinney 2010). New York 
New York declares surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable and as contrary to 
public policy.  Parties to a contract are subject to a civil penalty of up to $500.  Those 
who assist in arranging the contract are liable for a civil penalty of up to $10,000 and 
forfeiture of the fee received in brokering the contract; a second violation constitutes 
a felony.  A birth mother’s participation in the contract, however, may not be held 
against her in a custody dispute with the genetic parents or grandparents. 
VOID & UNENFORCEABLE 
Indiana IND. CODE § 31-20-1-2 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 
 209. ARONS, supra note 1, at 35-40. 
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Indiana declares surrogacy agreements unenforceable and against public policy.  
But, if a parentage determination must be made, courts should not base their best 
interest analysis solely on the fact that a person entered into a surrogacy agreement. 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (West 2006). Kentucky 
Kentucky declares traditional surrogacy agreements void but does not address 
gestational surrogacy.  Compensation is prohibited. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (2005). Louisiana 
Louisiana declares traditional surrogacy agreements null, void, and unenforceable 
as contrary to public policy.  The state does not address gestational surrogacy. 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (LexisNexis 2004). Nebraska 
Nebraska declares surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable.  The law assigns 
rights and obligations regarding the child to the biological father. 
ALLOWS BUT REGULATES 
ALA. CODE § 26-17-801 (LexisNexis 2009) (official comment). Alabama 
Surrogacy contracts must be judicially approved to be enforceable.  Those that are 
not judicially approved are unenforceable but not void. 
 
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-10-201 to -202 (2009). Arkansas 
Arkansas permits surrogacy contracts for married, unmarried couples, and single 
people.  If a woman is a surrogate, then the child’s parents will be: (1) the biological 
father and his wife, if he is married; (2) the biological father alone, if he is 
unmarried; or (3) the intended mother, if anonymous sperm was used. 
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.212-.213(West 2005 & Supp. 2011) and 742.15-.16 (West 2010). Florida 
Florida regulates traditional and gestational surrogacy separately. 
Traditional surrogacy is referred to as a “preplanned adoption agreement” with a 
“voluntary mother” and requires court approval of the adoption.  The birth mother 
has 48 hours after the birth of the child to change her mind, the adoption must be 
approved by a court, and the intended parents do not have to be biologically related 
to the child. 
Under a gestational surrogacy contract, the surrogate must agree to relinquish her 
rights to the child upon birth, the intended mother must show that she cannot safely 
maintain a pregnancy or deliver a child, and at least one of the intended parents 
must be genetically related to the child. 
Both laws require the following: all surrogates must submit to medical evaluation; 
the surrogate is the default parent if an intended parent turns out not to be 
genetically related to the child; the types of payment allowed are limited and 
recruitment fees for traditional surrogacy agreements are prohibited; the surrogate 
must be at least 18 years old; and the intended parents must agree to accept any 
resulting child, regardless of any impairment the child may have.  
Illinois The Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/1-75 (West 
2009), 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6 (West 2009), 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12 (West 
2011). 
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Illinois allows single people, unmarried couples, and married couples to enter into 
gestational surrogacy contracts.  The surrogate may not supply her own eggs, and at 
least one of the intended parents must be genetically related to the child.  Under a 
valid agreement, the intended parents become the legal parents immediately upon 
birth, and the parent-child relationship can even be established before birth.  A 
person can bring a challenge to the agreement or the rights assigned under it within 
12 months of the child’s birth. 
There is no residency requirement for the intended parents, but the contract must be 
entered into under Illinois law and the child must be born in Illinois.  A licensed 
physician must certify that there is a medical need for the surrogacy.  The intended 
parents must complete a mental health evaluation and consult with an independent 
attorney regarding the contract.  The gestational surrogate must be at least 21 years 
old, must have previously given birth to a child, and must complete medical and 
mental health evaluations, and must consult with an independent attorney about 
the surrogacy contract.  Compensation is restricted to reasonable living, medical, 
legal, and psychological expenses incurred as a result of the pregnancy.  The 
surrogacy contract must be executed prior to the commencement of any medical 
procedures related to the intended conception.  If the statutory requirements are not 
met, a court shall determine parentage based on evidence of the parties’ intent.  
NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.045 (LexisNexis 2010). Nevada 
Nevada allows married couples to enter into a contract with a surrogate for 
“assisted conception.”  Based on the definition of that phrase, the statute applies to 
gestational surrogacy when both the intended parents have supplied the gametes 
and are thereby both genetically related to the resulting child.  Payment is restricted 
to living and medical expenses related to the birth. 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16-32 (LexisNexis 2010). New Hampshire 
New Hampshire enforces surrogacy contracts if all statutory requirements are met.  
The intended parents must be married and at least one of them must be biologically 
related to the child.  The surrogate has 72 hours after birth in which to decide 
whether to keep the child.  The arrangement must be judicially preauthorized.  
Evaluations and counseling of the parties must be conducted prior to impregnation 
of the surrogate, and home studies of all parties must be conducted.  All parties 
must be 21 or older.  The intended mother must be physically unable to bear a child, 
the eggs must come from the surrogate or the intended mother—no donor eggs are 
allowed, and the surrogate must have had at least one prior delivery.  Genetic 
counseling is required if the surrogate is 35 or older.  Finally, there is a residency 
requirement of 6 months for the gestational mother or the intended parents.  
Compensation is limited to medical expenses, lost wages, insurance, legal costs, and 
home studies.  Fees for arranging a surrogacy contract are prohibited.  There are 
also provisions addressing what happens if the contract is breached or terminated. 
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to -08, 14-19-01, 14-20-01 to -66 (2009). North Dakota 
North Dakota voids traditional surrogacy contracts.  If the surrogate is genetically 
related to the child, then she is declared the mother and her husband, if she is 
married, is deemed the father. 
North Dakota recognizes gestational surrogacy agreements.  Intended parents are 
the legal parents when they are both biologically related to the child. 
Oregon OR. ADMIN. R. 413-120-0200 (2009). 
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Surrogacy agreements for compensation are unenforceable.  The Oregon statute 
prohibiting buying or selling a person has an explicit exemption for fees for services 
in an adoption pursuant to a surrogacy agreement. 
 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.751-.763 (West 2008). Texas 
Texas’s law is modeled after Part 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act of 2002.  A 
gestational agreement must be validated in court.  The gestational mother may not 
use her own eggs.  She must have had at least one prior pregnancy and delivery.  
She maintains control over all health-related decisions during the pregnancy.  The 
intended mother must show that she is unable to carry a pregnancy or give birth.  
The intended parents must be married and must undergo a home study.  There is a 
residency requirement of at least 90 days for either the gestational mother or the 
intended parents.  An agreement that has not been validated is not enforceable, and 
parentage will be determined under the other parts of Texas’s Uniform Parentage 
Act. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-801 to -809 (LexisNexis 2008). Utah 
Utah’s law is modeled after Part 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act of 2002.  A 
gestational surrogacy agreement must be validated in court.  The gestational 
surrogate must have had at least one prior pregnancy and delivery.  She maintains 
control over all health-related decisions during the pregnancy.  She may not use her 
own eggs.  The intended mother must show that she is unable to carry a pregnancy 
or give birth.  At least one intended parent must provide gametes.  If the gestational 
surrogate is married, her husband’s sperm may not be used.  The intended parents 
must be married and must undergo a home study.  All parties must be at least 21 
years old and must participate in counseling.  There is a residency requirement of at 
least 90 days for either the gestational mother or the intended parents.  The 
gestational surrogate may not be receiving Medicaid or other state assistance at the 
time she enters the agreement.  Payment to the gestational surrogate is allowed but 
must be reasonable.  An agreement that has not been validated is not enforceable, 
and parentage will be determined under the other parts of Utah’s Uniform 
Parentage Act. 
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to -165 (2008). 
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Virginia requires pre-authorization of a surrogacy contract by a court.  If the 
contract is approved, then the intended parents will be the legal parents.  If the 
contract is voided, the surrogate mother and her husband, if any, will be named the 
legal parents and the intended parents will only be able to acquire parental rights 
through adoption.  If the contract was never approved, then the surrogate can file a 
consent form relinquishing rights to the child.  But if she does not, the parental 
rights will vary based on whether either of the intended parents has a genetic 
relationship to the child.  Based on the circumstances, they may need to adopt the 
child in order to obtain parental rights.  With that said, if the surrogate is the genetic 
mother, she may terminate the contract within the first 6 months of pregnancy. 
Virginia’s requirements for court approval include: a home study; a finding that all 
parties meet the standards of fitness applicable to adoptive parents; that the 
surrogate must be married and have delivered at least one prior live birth; that the 
parties must have undergone medical evaluations and counseling; that the intended 
mother must be infertile or unable to bear a child; and that at least one intended 
parent must be genetically related to the child.  The intended parents must accept 
the child regardless of its health or appearance.  The surrogate retains sole 
responsibility for the clinical management of the pregnancy.  During the approval 
proceedings, the court must appoint counsel for the surrogate and a guardian ad 
litem to represent the interests of any resulting children.  The court’s approval of 
assisted conception under the contract is effective for twelve months.  
Compensation beyond reasonable medical and ancillary costs is not allowed.  
Recruitment fees are punishable as a misdemeanor, and the parties may collect 
damages from the broker.  The law also provides for an allocation of costs when an 
unvalidated contract is terminated under various circumstances. 
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.210-60. (West 2005 & Supp. 2011) Washington 
Surrogate contracts are generally allowed but contracts for compensation are 
prohibited. If a dispute arises over a child born to a surrogate mother, the party with 
physical custody may retain custody until a court orders otherwise. Intended 
parents can establish their parentage under a valid surrogacy contract. If a child is 
born under an invalid contract, parentage shall be determined under the other parts 
of Washington’s Uniform Parentage Act. 
In contrast, contracts that pay compensation beyond reasonable expenses and 
contracts with unemancipated minors or women with a mental illness or disability 
are prohibited. Violation of these prohibitions is a gross misdemeanor. Contracts for 
compensation also are void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy. 
Compensation is defined as any payment beyond actual medical costs, other 
expenses related to pregnancy, and legal fees related to drafting of the contract.  
STATES WITHOUT STATUTES ADDRESSING SURROGACY AGREEMENTS 
Alaska; California; Colorado, Connecticut; Delaware; Georgia; Hawaii; Idaho; Iowa; Kansas; Maine; Maryland; 
Massachusetts; Minnesota; Mississippi; Missouri; Montana; New Jersey; New Mexico; North Carolina; Ohio; 
Oklahoma; Pennsylvania; Rhode Island; South Carolina; South Dakota; Tennessee; Vermont; West Virginia; 
Wisconsin; Wyoming. 
 
 
